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Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-7 6
details the process by which Government organizations manage
and conduct commercial activity competitions. This research
examined the requirements of OMB A-7 6 in terms of
competitions within the Services the Department of
Department of Defense. This research looked at the
application of OMB A-76 by commands during the period FY
1994 to present. Through a survey of contracting commands
within the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the researcher looked
at the nature of services that were being competitively
sourced. Additionally, lessons learned were collected from
the commands, augmenting published lessons learned from each
of the Services. Risk identification and management within
the A-7 6 process was also examined in the survey. The goal
in conducting the research was to aid Marine Corps
Contracting Officers in identifying a common family of
services capable of being competitively sourced. A secondary
goal was the identification of significant issues that
contacting officers will face when implementing OMB A-76.
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This research will examine the policies and procedures
prescribed in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
A-7 6 for the outsourcing of support services on Department
of Defense (DoD) installations. Specifically, the research
will review and analyze previous outsourcing efforts to
identify a common family of support services that are being
competitively sourced. Specific lessons learned will be
analyzed to identify significant issues that Regional
Contracting Officers of Marine Corps installations may face.
B . BACKGROUND
Since the early 1990s the Government, and specifically
the Department of Defense, have turned their attention to
the issue of commercial activities performed by the
Government and competitively sourcing those activities. The
driving factor in the renewed interest in competitively
sourcing commercial activities is a defense budget which
continues to shrink in regards to the amount of funds
available for modernization and procurement. By
competitively sourcing commercial activities aboard military
installations, defense officials hope to funnel those
savings into the modernization and procurement budgets. The
above situation is true for the Marine Corps and is a
driving factor in the examination of commercial services
capable of yielding cost savings. The leadership of the
Marine Corps does not foresee any significant increase in
the defense budget and has identified the following six
prime drivers as the rationale in the search to save money
1) the reduction in current defense spending as projected
future spending, 2) continued pressure on Budget from
entitlement programs, 3) undiminished operations tempo and
readiness requirements, 4) aging equipment and facilities,
5) increasing "Quality of Life" expectations, and 6) Marine
Corps tradition of being good resource stewards. [Ref.l]
With the above stated goals in mind, Headquarters
Marine Corps gave four mandates to the installations
commanders of the Marine Corps. The mission mandate is to
maintain the support to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and
improve the quality of life for Marines and their families.
Second, the funding mandate is to save $370 Million by
Fiscal Year (FY) 05 to go towards modernization, as well as
save $113 Million annually after FY 04. Mandate three is
ideological in that commercial activities should be
competitively sourced with the private sector whenever
possible. The final mandate is related to warfighting and
the ability to free up Marines for reassignment to the
FMF. [Ref . 1]
Given the current budgetary constraints on defense
spending and the mandates to maintain a well rounded force,
the Marine Corps is looking to competitively source
commercial activities for the first time since the 1980s. A
facet in the drive to reform the business practices of
Marine Corps installations is the application of OMB A-76 in
studying and competitively sourcing installation support
services
.
[Ref . 1] Given the nature of the competition
prescribed in OMB A-76, outsourcing is now referred to in
DoD circles as "competitive sourcing" . This change in terms
applies strictly to competition under the auspices of A-76
and does not include the privatization of Government
functions. Competitive sourcing looks not only at
commercial sources to perform services, it also incorporates
the ability of installations to reform their organizations
and "right size" organizations for optimal performance as
well as having other organizations in the Government perform
the activities. Since the Marine Corps has not
competitively sourced commercial activities to any great
extent, the answers to the following research questions may




The primary research question was: "What are the
significant issues that Marine Corps Contracting Officers
face when applying OMB Circular A-76 to the outsourcing of
installation support services, and how might they manage
these issues?" The subsidiary questions were:
1. What are the policies and procedures prescribed in




What is the nature and scope of installation
support services that are currently being
outsourced in the DoD?
3 Is there a common family of installation support
services across DoD, which is currently being
outsourced, and if so, what services comprise that
family?
4. What are the significant lessons learned from the
outsourcing efforts that will be applicable to
Marine Corps outsourcing of installation services?
5. What are the significant risk factors identified
in the contracting of services and how might these
risks be mitigated by Marine Corps Contracting
Officers?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
The audience for this thesis includes policy makers
within DoD and the Marine Corps, and Regional Contracting
Officers assigned to Marine Corps installations. This
thesis addresses the requirements of OMB A-76 to the
competitive sourcing of non-Governmental functions that
support DoD military installations. It will look at the
procedural requirements of OMB A-7 6 for the competitive
sourcing of installation support services, including
restriction on outsourcing of certain services, competition
with in-house organization, the A-76 study process and
identify those classification of services which OMB states
are non-Governmental. This thesis will research the prior
competitive sourcing efforts under OMB A-76 to identify a
common family of services that have been competitively
sourced, as well as services traditionally kept within the
scope of the Government. By looking at past experience and
the lessons learned from competitively sourcing efforts, a
common set of issues will be identified that Marine Corps
Regional Contracting Officers may face in the coming years
as the requirements to save money on installation costs
increase. In addition to the lessons learned, the thesis
will also look for significant risk factors that must be
mitigated by the Regional Contracting Officers to
successfully and competitively source installation support
services. This thesis will benefit the Installation
Commander and the Regional Contracting Officer by
identifying services that lend themselves to competitive
sourcing as well as potential issues.
E . LIMITATIONS
The focus of the thesis is competitive sourcing of
installation support services. As such it will not delve
into the arena of privatization of non-Governmental
functions aboard DoD installations. The competitive
sourcing of maintenance operations at military depots will
also not be addressed as it falls outside of the scope of
the primary and secondary research questions
.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this thesis will focus on an in
depth examination of past competitive sourcing actions by
the Department of Defense. A comparison and contrast of
competitive sourcing efforts across the spectrum of DoD will
generate a consolidated view of previous competitive
sourcing efforts. The consolidated data from previous
experiences will then be applied to those questions focused
on process improvement for competitive sourcing of
installation support.
Data are collected in two forms. The first is a
literature review from the Dudley Knox Library and the World
Wide Web. The literature review provides the researcher
with background information in current policies and
practices, to gain an understanding of previous competitive
sourcing efforts throughout DoD.
The second type of data collected focuses on interviews
and surveys with acquisition and installation reform
officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as
well as each of the Services. Interviews with Headquarters
Marines Corps Installation Reform Branch will provide
information in the driving factors behind the Marine Corps
efforts in competitive sourcing. The interviews with
installation contracting officers and other Service
contracting organizations is meant to gather information on
lessons learned and risks associated with the competitive
sourcing process delineated in OMB A-76.
G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH
This thesis is designed to benefit the Installation
Commander and the Regional Contracting Officer in efforts to
competitively source installation support services. By
drawing from lessons learned at individual installations
across DoD as well as in litigation, common pitfalls can be
identified for the Contracting Officer. The end result will
be a thesis capable of being one of many information tools
used by the Contracting Officer when competitively sourcing
commercial activities at Marine Corps installation.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
The research will be divided into five chapters. This
chapter provides the objectives of the research, the scope
of the research. and questions to be answered.
Chapter II provides background information on
competitive sourcing policies and procedures prescribed by
OMB A-76 and Congress. Additionally, the restrictions to
competitive sourcing of inherently Governmental functions
and other functions delineated by Congress will be examined.
In Chapter III, the data collected on past experience
of competitive sourcing within DoD will be presented. It
will look at the number of A-76 studies undertaken. In
doing so, the focus will be on the nature and scope of
services that were competitively sourced. The competitive
sourcing efforts of each of the services will be examined in
order to identify a common family of services that have been
previously outsourced. The next section of the chapter will
focus on the lessons learned from previous competitive
sourcing efforts of each of the services. In addition to
formal lessons learned litigation and protests from previous
competitive sourcing efforts will also be scrutinized. The
results of a survey of contracting commands will also be
8
presented focusing on field experience with lessons learned
and risk management.
Chapter IV will present the analysis of the data in
Chapter III. The focus of the analysis will be on the
process of A-76 and the impacts it has on contracting. The
management process will be examined from the leadership and
contracting perspectives. The chapter will identify risks
associated with the common family of services identified in
Chapter III. The contract type used in competitive sourcing
will also be examined for possible impact on the nature and
amount of risk that installation commanders must accept.
The last portion of the chapter will focus on those risk
management tools that can be applied to competitive sourcing
of installation support services.
The final chapter summarizes the conclusions made,
makes recommendations to Marine Corps Regional Contracting
Officers regarding the common family of services and risk
management tools and identifies areas of further research.
THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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II. BACKGROUND
A. DRIVING FORCE BEHIND COMPETITIVE SOURCING
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the budget for the
Department of Defense began to shrink. The fall of the
Berlin Wall, symbolic of the Communist "Iron Curtain" added
momentum to the downsizing of the military. Since the fall
of the Former Soviet Union, DoD has reduced the number of
active duty military and civilian personnel, closed or
realigned military installations and reduced the amount of
money spent on procurement, operations and maintenance.
Today DoD finds itself in the situation where the defense
budget continues to shrink, with little hope in sight of
budgets dramatically increasing.
Given a finite amount of funding for operations,
procurement, readiness and installation operation, DoD has
had to look for methods of squeezing more out of every
dollar appropriated. With the current budget reductions,
the logical choice is to reduce the amount of money spent on
the infrastructure while maintaining money for procurement
and operational readiness. This has meant that the Services
are looking to their installation commanders to yield
savings to make up for shortfalls in funding for
procurement, operations and maintenance.
11
The driving force behind these cost savings initiatives
has been expressed on numerous occasions by leaders within
the Government and DoD. The Quadrennial Defense Review
proposed improving the efficiency of the DoD through number
of actions to include streamlining, reorganizing,
downsizing, consolidating, computerizing and commercializing
operations
.
[Ref . 2:p. 15] Streamlining of operations and
revolutions in business practices are not isolated to just
the Department of Defense. The National Performance Review
attempted to streamline operations throughout the Federal
Government. Vice President Gore has been a driving force in
the effort to reduce the bloated Federal Government in
general . For DoD this has meant renewed interest in
competitively sourcing commercial activities that are not
inherently governmental
.
B. POLICY ON COMPETITION WITH PRIVATE SECTOR
The origin of the current DoD competitive sourcing
policy dates back to 1955 when the U.S. Government created a
precedent that it should not compete with private industry
in providing goods and services. Promulgated in 1966, the
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 outlines
conditions in which the Government would rely upon the
private sector for provision of goods and services that are
not inherently public or governmental in nature. [Ref. 3:p.
12
9] The guiding principle within OMB Circular A-7 6 is the
belief that the United States Government should not compete
with the private sector to provide goods and services.
Specifically the policy is:
In the process of governing, the Government
should not compete with its citizens. The
competitive enterprise system, characterized by
individual freedom and initiative, is the
primary source of national economic strength.
In recognition of the principle, it has been
and continues to be the general policy of the
Government to rely on commercial sources to
supply products and services the Government
needs. [Ref . 4]
The Government does recognize that there are certain
functions that it must perform and these, "inherently
governmental functions" are "so intimately related to the
public interest as to mandate performance by Governmental
employees ." [Ref . 5] Appendix C lists those functions
considered to be inherently Governmental by the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy.
In addition to OMB Circular A-76, Congress recently
enacted the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998
(FAIR Act) to address the issue of Government performance of
commercial activities. The law requires that the head of
each executive agency shall submit to the Director of OMB, a
list of activities performed by Federal Government sources
for the executive agency, which in their opinion are not
13
inherently Governmental functions. [Ref. 6] The FAIR Act
stops short of mandating that the Government outsource
commercial services, but the intent is obvious. Even with
the policy set forth in OMB A-7 6 and the FAIR Act, the DoD
and the military departments and Services continue to find
they are competing in many areas with private industry to
provide basic services at military installations. In cases
where OMB A-76 has been applied and services were
competitively sourced, the application of the process,
across the military services, has been far from uniform or
comprehensive
.
C. DoD OUTSOURCING 1978-1994
During the period from 1978 to 1994 DoD undertook a
large number of A-76 studies to consider the use of
competitively sourced labor to meet military installation
requirements. Following the guidelines established in A-7 6,
each of the Services set out to identify commercial
activities capable of being competitively sourced, develop a
Most Efficient Organization (MEO) and then compete that
against the commercial sector as required. During the
period FY 1978-1994 there was a total of 82,646 positions in
commercial activities subject to cost comparison studies
(17,632 of those positions were military). As a result of




[Ref . 7:p. 20]
The majority of the cost comparison studies reflected
in the above statistics occurred during the early 1980s.
What is not shown is that a significant number of those
competitions were held during the middle to last half of the
1980s and that, starting in 1990, competitions dwindled.
Chart 2-1 depicts the total number of cost comparisons that
were completed by the Services during the period FY 197 8-
1995 and the drop in competitive sourcing starting in 1990.























Figure 2-1. Completed A-76 Cost Comparisons Source [Ref. 7:p. 26]
Evident in the chart is the fact the DoD allowed the
competition of commercial activities to dwindle starting in
FY88 . In FY89 the number of competitions completed was cut
in half from the previous fiscal year's competitions. It
was not until the FY95 that DoD again took a serious look at
15
implementing A-76 as a cost savings measure
.
[Ref . 8:p. 4]
For the Marine Corps, the application of OMB A-76 and
performance of commercial activities studies has always been
small in comparison to the other Services. During the
period FY 1978-1995, the Marine Corps completed only 44
commercial activities studies. The Marine Corps basically
ceased the conduct of the studies in FY88 (except for three
studies in FY90 and one in FY91) . Until the most recent
competitive sourcing studies were announced as part of the
Installation Reform Business Plan, seven years has elapsed
since the Marine Corps last conducted an A-76 study.
The rise in competitive sourcing in the last four years
is a result of the renewed interest in reducing installation
costs to channel savings into other accounts. Table 2-1
contains the expected number of commercial activity
positions that will be competed. [Ref . 9:p. 5]
Component Fiscal Year
L
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Army 13173 13484 13477
i
8146 8138
Navy 10500 15000 20000 20000 15000
Air Force 13367 21195 18494 10107
Marine Corps 800 1700 1700 800
Total 37040 50479J 53671 39953 23938J
Table 2-1. FY 1997-2002 Projected Competitions
Currently, DoD is projecting to compete over 200,000




D. A- 7 6 PROCESS
In applying A-7 6 to any competitive sourcing action
there first must be a determination as to the nature of the
services to be studied, and whether it is commercial in
nature. As stated, there are certain functions that are
inherently Governmental in nature or restricted from
competitive sourcing by law or executive decision. The
decision whether a function is inherently Governmental rests
on a number of factors including the level of governmental
control, the ministerial nature of the function, and
distinguishing between recurring operations and oversight.
[Ref. 10] The Office of Federal Procurement Policy does
provide guidance as to what services are considered to be
inherently governmental in nature.
The second consideration in the application of OMB A-76
to activities that are considered commercial in nature is
whether there is a need for a cost comparison to convert the
activity to or from in-house, contract or Inter Service
Support Agreement (ISSA) . There are nine situations where
cost comparison are not required, including services in the
following categories:
1. National Defense or Intelligence Security.
2 . Patient Care
.




4. Research and Development.
5. No Satisfactory Commercial Source Available
6. Functions with 10 or fewer Full Time Employees
(FTE) . For functions with 11 or more FTE a cost
comparison is not needed if a fair and reasonable
price can be obtained through competition and all




Current performance by Government exceeds
generally recognized industry performance and cost
standards
.
8. Temporary authorizations for in-house performance.
In cases where a cost comparison is required, the
guiding document in the conduct of the cost comparison is
OMB A-76. The majority of writing in the 1996 Supplement to
0MB A-7 6 is devoted to the development of the cost
comparison for the commercial activity
.
[Ref . 10] The cost
comparison is the basis through which the competition
process will be implemented. Additionally, it forms the
framework through which a final decision is made as to the
disposition of a commercial activity. In cases where a cost
comparison is required, there are six major steps to the
cost comparison that must be completed, including the
18
following:
1. Development of a Performance Work Statement (PWS)




Performance of a Management study to determine the
Government's Most Efficient Organization (MEO)
3 Development of the in-house Government cost
estimate
.
4. Issue the Request for Proposal (RFP) or Invitation
for Bid (IFB)
.
5 Comparison of the in-house bid against the
proposed contract or Inter-service Support
Agreement price.
6 Administrative appeal process to assure all costs
entered on the Cost Comparison Form are fair,
accurate and calculated in accordance with
requirements of A-76.
The first step in the cost comparison is the
development of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) and the
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) . The PWS defines
what is being requested, the performance standards and
measures and timeframes of performance. It is developed in
such a manner as to ensure that it does not limit service
operations, arbitrarily increase risk, reduce competition,
violate industry service or service group norms or omit
19
statutory or regulatory requirements. The PWS is
performance-oriented, stating what outputs or measures are
desired as well as limiting directions, yet does not
indicate to the supplier how a service should be
accomplished. [Ref . 10]
The QASP is designed to compliment the PWS in that it
describes the methods of inspections to be used, the reports
required and the resources to be expended. The QASP does
not need to be published in the solicitation nor is it given
to Government employees developing the management study.
Competing sources, to include the management plan, are
expected to develop a Quality Assurance Plan based solely on
the requirements outlined in the PWS. [Ref. 10]
The development of the Management Plan detailing the
Government's Most Efficient Organization (MEO) is the next
step in the cost comparison process and is the basis for the
Government's in-house cost estimate. The Management Plan
reflects the scope of the PWS and should identify the
organizational structure needed to meet the outlined
requirements. The Management Plan documents the best
structure, staffing, and operating procedures, equipment,
and inspection plans to ensure that the in-house activity is
performed in an effective and cost efficient manner. [Ref.
10] Additionally, the Management Plan must document the
20
assumptions used in developing the MEO and in-house cost
estimate, including the assets of the organization, Quality-
Assurance Plan, Transition Plan and the in-house cost
estimate
.
The next step in the cost comparison is the issuing of
the solicitation through appropriate channels. The
solicitation is done in accordance with the FAR, Service
regulations and any other applicable statutory requirements.
Depending on the nature of the services being competitively
sourced, either an Invitation For Bid (IFB) or a Request For
Proposal (RFP) can be used. The proposals received are
treated the same as those received for any other competition
with regard to the security of each offer submitted.
The fifth step in this process is comparison between
the in-house bid and the proposed contract or ISSA price.
In the case of sealed bids, the contracting officer opens
all bids, to include the in-house estimate and enters the
prices on the cost comparison form. A tentative decision is
announced based on these data, subject to evaluation for
responsiveness, and responsibility. [Ref . 10] In the case of
a negotiated or best value procurement, the most
advantageous private sector or ISSA proposal is compared
against the in-house estimate on the Cost Comparison Form
and an award is made as required.
21
The final step in the cost comparison process is the
resolution of any protests by unsuccessful offerors, whether
they be private sector, ISSA or an in-house organization.
This is the same challenge faced by all contracting
officers, regardless of the nature of the procurement. As
part of the policy of promoting free and open competition,
there are no steps that contracting officers can take to
mitigate this final step.
E. BENEFITS OF A-76
In reviewing the competitions completed by DoD during
the period FY 1978-1994, the results of the competitive
sourcing studies support the notion that the Services can
save money by applying A-76. In cases where the application
of OMB A-7 6 resulted in competition between the private and
public sector, there were associated cost savings varying
from 27% to 3 6%, regardless of whether the work was kept in-
house under the MEO or contracted out to private industry.
Table 2-2 shows the savings from A-7 6 competitions held
during the period of 1978 to 1994:
22
















Total 2138 $1,478 31%
Table 2-2. FY 1978-1994 A-76 Savings Source [Ref. 11 :p. 8]
Table 2-2 shows that a benefit of the competitive
sourcing process is the ability of the commercial sector to
take advantage of two factors; the ability to efficiently
utilize available labor, and economies of scale. In the
past, competition was not controversial and there was only
moderate motivation to reduce operating costs. However,
competition is the key to successful application of A-76. As
such, Table 2-2 should not be interpreted to imply that cost
savings are not realized if the commercial activity remains
in-house. In cases where the in-house MEO is the successful
bidder, the MEO reflects a streamlined Government operation
with fewer employees capable of providing the same level
service for less money. In this case, there is a motivation
factor, as the MEO must be able to perform at the stated
level of capability and within the given budget, or they run
the risk of being competitively sourced again.
23
Given the relatively small number of positions that
were competitively sourced in DoD (approximately 46,103
positions) , it is too early to speculate whether a wider
application of A-76 will yield the same results. There are
questions whether DoD will experience the cost savings that
have been projected in the latest round of competitive
sourcing initiatives. By the end of FY 03 DoD is projecting
to save approximately $2.5 billion annually. The question
is whether these savings will actually materialize. In a
March 1997 report, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
questioned the savings projections of DoD.[Ref. 12:p. 6] GAO
pointed out that neither DoD nor OMB has reliable data upon
which to assess the accuracy of the savings estimates . They
point out a number of contributing factors that may diminish
projected savings, including mandated wage increases and
poorly written Performance Work Statements. GAO also cited
reviews by the Naval Audit Service, that show projected
savings, but not as much as originally projected. [Ref
.
12:p. 10]
In addition to the concerns noted by GAO, a RAND
Corporation study also points out the potential for
contractor "low-balling" during the bidding process. [Ref.
7:p. 48] Additionally, this study points out that after the
first few months of contractor operations, deficiencies in
24
the PWS are often revealed, requiring contract modification
and price adjustment
.
[Ref . 7:p. 48] Although there are
questions as to whether the projected cost savings can be
realized, it is evident that some level of savings will be
achieved through the application of A-76.
F. A-76 APPLICATION ISSUES
Prior DoD experience with competitive sourcing has
yielded savings. Yet, despite success with A-76, there are
a number of problem areas that affect widespread
application. These problems are resident in the circular,
institutionalized in each of the Services, and in some
cases, are imposed by DoD or Congress.
One of the fundamental issues that surfaces when
reviewing OMB A-7 6 and its application is the definition of
"inherently Governmental functions" and what functions
should be open to competitive sourcing. OMB A-76 lists
numerous functions within several broad categories that
qualify as commercial services. As noted, the comprehensive
list of eligible commercial activities is provided in
Appendix B
.
Suffice it to say, there is no consensus among the
individual Services or even installation commanders as to
what constitutes a commercial activity or an inherently
Governmental function. This fact is highlighted in a
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General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress, which
points out "...DoD does not have a generally accepted
definition of base support activities, and the services
differ on how they define base support activities". In this
study, GAO reported that the Army had identified 122
functions as base support, the Navy through the Center for
Naval Analysis had identified 37, while the Air Force and
the Marine Corps did not have a standardized definition of
base support operations. [Ref. 12 :p. 23]
However, the definition of commercial activities may be
changing with the requirements to compile lists of
commercial activities on a yearly basis in accordance with
the FAIR Act. Additionally, there is a small but growing
movement among the Services to consolidate the lists of
commercial activities across major commands and
installations
.
Even with a clearer definition of commercial
activities, commands still face the challenge of conducting
the commercial activity studies. Recent changes within A-76
have shortened the time period to conduct studies of in-
house performance. Currently, single activity studies must
be completed within 18 months, while multi-service studies
have 3 6 months to be completed. These timeframes are
ambitious considering past DoD performance in completing the
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studies. On average 4 years and 3 months have been required
to complete an A-76 study (during fiscal years 1987 to
1990). [Ref. 12:p. 17] It is unclear what impact, if any,
shortening of the timeframe will have on the conduct of the
studies. Reviews of the limited number of studies completed
in the last few years show there has been an improvement in
the time required to complete studies. Yet there continues
to be isolated problems in terms of starting and completing
studies in the required timeframe. [Ref. 13 :p. 9]
The greatest concern that the Services face in
completing the studies on time is the availability of
personnel to conduct the studies. In the past, the majority
of studies were conducted using in-house staff. OMB reports
that continued downsizing of military forces, both uniform
and civilian, has meant that there are fewer personnel
familiar with the A-7 6 process capable of conducting the
studies. To help alleviate this problem, all of the
Services have reviewed the option of outsourcing parts of
the A-76 study while retaining the in-house cost estimate
work and other inherently Governmental functions as they
relate to the A-76 process. [Ref. 12 :p. 17]
Manpower issues extend beyond the availability of
personnel. In cases where there is sufficient experience and
manpower to conduct the study, there is a further impediment
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of not having civilian employees who want to work on the
study. In site visits to several installations, the RAND
Corporation found that functional managers had a difficult
time getting experienced civil service employees to
participate in developing the PWS.[Ref. 7:p. 49] The reasons
for the difficulty in getting civil service participation
vary from concern over the fact that their jobs may be
outsourced, possibly leaving them in the ranks of the
unemployed, to concern over being labeled a "procurement
official." Legal restrictions exist preventing displaced
employees from going to work for the contractor who wins the
contract for two years if an employee participants in the
study in such a manner as to be considered a "procurement
official." Given such restrictions, and the fact that
employees may lose their jobs, there is little incentive for
employees to volunteer for the A-76 process. [Ref. 7:p. 49]
Another of the institutional impediments relates to
uniform Service personnel and the impact they have on the
competitive sourcing process. One fear base commanders have
is that they will lose control over the performance of
commercial services aboard their installations, and the
individual service member and his or her family will suffer.
Instinctively, base commanders feel the need to be in charge
and are unwilling at times to have to negotiate with
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contractors to get something done that is not within the
scope of the PWS . Commanders are accustomed to being able
to delegate duties and give orders knowing that those orders
will be carried out without question on issues related to
contract ramifications and cost. GAO reports that,
...Relatively short tours of duty of base
commanders limits institutional knowledge and
often results in focusing on short term projects
and not major changes in base operations
involving long term planning and implementation.
[Ref. 14:p. 13]
Another impediment originating in the circular itself,
deals with the process of analyzing the Government activity
and then comparing it to potential competitors. The
circular mandates that the Government organization compete
against the offerors based on the actual cost of performing
the given function. Currently, for a commercial activity to
be awarded to a contractor, the bid from that contractor
must meet a savings threshold of 10 percent of personnel
costs or $10 million over the performance period. [Ref.
13 :p. 24] In cases where the threshold has not been met, the
activity remains in-house. In best value procurement,
trade-off factors are evaluated between the contractor and
the Government . In cases where the MEO does not meet the
performance levels of the contractor, the MEO modifies its
operation and bid to meet the best value criteria, and then
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costs are compared again.
Additionally, the supplement to OMB A-76 provides
guidance in calculating these cost. However, it is far from
comprehensive and often is silent on calculating some costs
that installations face. With no standard currently used to
measure Government operating costs, DoD has looked to
implement Activity Based Costing as a process for capturing
the costs of performing commercial activities. Measurement
of costs is not standardized across DoD, and since the
military in the past has not been required to track costs,
the Services do not have a good understanding of how to
accomplish this task. A GAO report in 1998 reiterated this
fact in stating. [Ref . 12:p. 9]
The ability to accurately capture costs is tied into
the development of the PWS, as it defines what costs must be
captured and included in the competitive proposal submitted
by the MEO. The primary questions are: what method does a
particular command use to capture costs, and does the method
truly capture the total costs of providing a particular
service? Reviews of services that have been contracted are
mixed in terms of the ability of the Government to
accurately capture costs through the development of a
comprehensive PWS. In some cases, there are hidden costs
that were not accounted for due to a poorly constructed PWS,
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which increases the total cost of the contract once it was
awarded to a contractor. In other cases, the cost of the
competitive sourcing did not increase and the projected
savings were attained. A critical factor is the completeness
of the PWS in its ability to capture all of the work that
the Government expects to be performed. [Ref. 7:p. 48]
Development of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) is
critical to the success of the competitive sourcing of
commercial activities as it sets the groundwork for the
entire process. The definition of the PWS is as follows:
A Performance Work Statement is a statement of
the technical functional and performance
characteristics of the work to be performed,
identifies essential functions to be performed,
determines performance factors, including the
location of the work, the units of work, the
quantity of work units, and the quality and
timeliness of the work units. It serves as the
scope of the work and the basis for all costs.
[Ref. 10]
The Performance Work Statement has, in the past, been
difficult to prepare. It requires putting a team of
military and civil service employees together to capture the
specific requirements of commercial activity in writing. As
the PWS serves as the basis upon which proposals will be
evaluated against, as well as to be used by the Government
in developing the in-house estimate and MEO, it must
accurately reflect all activities involved in the operation.
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Unfortunately, in some cases the teams writing the PWS have
been poorly trained in the construction of legal documents
and unfamiliar with writing requirements. This resulted in
poor criteria upon which to evaluate proposals. More
importantly, it left the Government vulnerable to poor
performance, possible legal action and potential cost
increases
.
Additionally, there is the potential for
misrepresentation on the part of A-76 team members in an
effort to keep their jobs. [Ref. 15] It must be pointed out
that the probability of A-7 6 team members sabotaging the
process is unlikely, but it must be considered. Oversight
by the Contracting Officer during the development of the
acquisition strategy is the primary place one would expect
to catch discrepancies in the PWS.
The final area to be examined is the legal restriction
to outsourcing specific services and the desire of the
Services to not surrender part of their "kingdoms".
Specific legal restrictions include the prohibition against
outsourcing fire fighting and policing services aboard
installations. Additionally, there are congressional
mandates that a given percentage of work done in the
military's depot maintenance facilities be performed by
Government employees. [Ref. 11 :p. 9]
32
Other legal restriction have appeared in the past in
language written into defense authorization and
appropriation laws specifically forbidding the use of funds
for the competitive sourcing of activities. For example,
the National Defense Authorization Acts of 1993 and 1994
placed broad restrictions on the contracting of commercial
activities through competitive sourcing. The 1993 language
stated:
The Secretary of Defense may not, during the
period beginning on the date of enactment of
this Act [October 23, 1992] and ending on
September 30, 1993, enter into any contract for
the performance of a commercial activity in any
case in which the contract results from a cost
comparison study conducted by the Department of
Defense under Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-76 or any successor administrative
regulation or policy. [Ref. 7:p. 24]
Although there continue to be numerous restrictions on
which activities may be studied, in recent years this has
been lessened since there has been a greater DoD push to
examine the benefits of competitive sourcing. [Ref. 7:p. 25]
The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996 introduced several new restrictions and
provisions. These generally seem more
outsourcing-friendly than provisions found in
earlier years Defense Authorization Acts.... [Ref.
7:p. 25]
G. SUMMARY
Given the continued shrinkage of the defense budget and
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the likelihood that this trend will not change markedly in
the near future, DoD is faced with a situation where it must
save money on installation costs . It is unlikely that
Congress will allow another round of Base Realignment and
Closures to aid in reducing the number of installations and
operating costs. Therefore, the Services must look to other
means to achieve the savings. The logical choice is to
utilize A-76 to take advantage of the competitive market
economy and use competition to reduce operating costs.
Past A-76 competitions have yielded cost savings for
DoD. Although there continues to be speculation about
whether DoD can achieve projected savings, there is no doubt
that a substantial level of savings may be achieved.
The question then becomes how do Installation
Commanders and their Contracting Officers take full
advantage of the A-7 6 and its ability to save on operating
costs? Chapter III will review recent competitive sourcing
actions by DoD in an effort to find a common approaches
which Contracting Officer can use. Given the fundamental
shift in attitude towards competitive sourcing in DoD, the
most recent competitive sourcing activities starting in 1994
will be analyzed in Chapter III.
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION
A . INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First it will
describe the methodology employed in conducting the survey
for this thesis. Secondly, this chapter will present a
summary of the data collected from both the survey and other
sources. An analysis of the data will be presented in
Chapter IV.
A survey was conducted to obtain data that would
supplement the available literature in answering the
research questions presented in Chapter I. Data from
sources other that the survey included databases of
competitive sourcing studies on the World Wide Web, protest
actions and legal proceedings, and lessons learned available
on the World Wide Web.
The focus of the survey was to obtain feedback from
contracting commands that are currently undergoing or have
recently completed A-76 studies. Contracting commands were
solicited to provide responses on a non-attribution basis.
The data sought related to the nature of commercial
activities that were looked at for competitive sourcing,
lessons learned from those competitive sourcing actions, and
identification of potential risk factors associated with the
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A-76 process that could jeopardize contracting activities.
The questions asked were formulated to assist in compiling a
list of services that could easily be competitively sourced,
having been done in the past by other Services. In addition
to looking for a common family of services, common lessons
learned hopefully tied to the family of services were
sought. The final aspect of the survey was the
identification of risk factors that a Contracting Officer
must address when conducting a competitive sourcing program.
B . METHODOLOGY
The base population for the survey was contracting
commands within the uniformed Services of the Department of
Defense. Each of the Services (Army, Navy and Air Force)
were contacted regarding participation in the survey. In
all, there were a total of 70 commands that were solicited
for input. There were 10 surveys sent to Army commands, 24
to Air Force commands, and 3 6 sent to Navy Commands. Of
those 7 commands that were surveyed there were a total of
22 responses (31 percent of the population) 1 .
A number of organizations that were excluded due to the
nature of the primary and secondary research questions
presented in Chapter I and included the following
' Of the Services solicited, 50 percent of the Army and Air Force commands responded, while the Navy




1. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
2
.
All non-Service related intelligence commands
(i.e., Defense Intelligence Agency)
3 Depot Maintenance Organizations
4. Defense Commissary Agency (DECA)
5. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)
6 Service organizations that had yet to complete
work on the construction of Performance Work
Statements
C. DATA SUMMARY
The data summary will be presented in two parts. The
first section will present the data obtained through the
survey of contracting commands. The second part will present
the data obtained from literature and sites on the World
Wide Web. Both section of data presentation will generally
follow the line of questioning presented in the survey (see
Appendix D)
.
1. Data Collected From Survey
This section will address data collected as a
result of the survey that was sent to officials who had




1. Since 1994, how many competitive sourcing studies
of commercial activities has your command
undertaken? [100% Responded]
This question along with the second question were
designed to determine a given command's level of
experience with the A-76 process.
All of the respondents answered this question,
with only two respondents stating that their commands
had not undertaken any A-7 6 studies during the time
period in question. Of the Air Force respondents there
were a total of 47 A-76 studies completed or in
progress. Army respondents indicated that 22 studies
were completed or currently being conducted. The Navy
respondents had completed or were in the process of
completing 44 studies.
2 . Of the commercial activities studied, how many
resulted in competition between the Most Efficient
Organization (MEO) and a contractor or Inter Service
Support Agreement (ISSA)? How many were directly
converted? [100% Responded]
As for the preceding question, this question was
designed to gauge the level of experience of the
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respondents in areas of cost comparison and direct
conversion of commercial activities The cost
comparison and direct conversion data for all of the
respondents is in the below table.























Table 3-1 Responses To Survey Question Two
In the case of respondent #19, they stated that the
command had taken the position that they would not
pursue A-7 6 as the sole method of reducing costs,
instead focusing on other methods of business reform.
Additionally, the respondent stated that their funding
came from the Service and the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) which precluded them from exercising
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control over the funding to achieve cost
avoidance /savings
.
3 . What group within your organization determined which
commercial activities would be opened to competition? [100%
Responded]
This question was designed to highlight which
organization or person within the Services is
designating the functions to be looked at for
competitive sourcing and the level of commitment by the
organization. The response of each of the participants
is located in Table 3-2.
Respondent Organization Directing Studies
1 Manpower Organization
2 Major Command Organization
3 Wing Commander





9 Director of Business Operations





15 Major Command/Installation Commander
16 Installation Commander
17 Major Command/Installation Commander
18 Major Command Organization
19 Organization Commander
20 Major Command Organization
21 Major Command Organization
22 Major Command Organization
Table 3-2 Responses To Survey Question Three
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In the case where the responses indicated that the
Manpower Organization determined eligible commercial
activities, there were zero indications as to whether
this Manpower Organization was located at the
installation or major command level.
4. Does your organization have a list of commercial
activities that are excluded from competition?
[95% Responded
]
The intent of this question was to gauge the
willingness of the commands to competitively source
commercial activities. The original goal was to have
commands provide input confirming the existence of
restricted lists and then provide input at to the
originator of the lists. Unfortunately, the question
was not worded in such a way as to elicit responses
indicating the origins of such lists in cases where
they exist.
In the case of respondents #8, #17, #20 and #22,
they expanded on their answers by stating that their
commands adhere to restrictions resident in public laws
and 0MB A-76. Respondent 9 indicated that switchboard
operations were looked for inclusion on the procurement
list for the National Industries for the Blind, but did
not state whether the services were set aside for
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restricted competition. Each of the responses is
summarized below in Table 3-3.























Table 3-3 Responses To Survey Question Four
In the case of respondent #19, they listed several
functions that were precluded from competitive sourcing
including intelligence-related activities, financial
management, and contracting, senior level management.
Respondent #21 stated that no list existed, but that
functions are evaluated on a case by case basis when a
function is nominated for study.
5 . What was the general nature of services that were
competitively sourced (i.e., facilities maintenance.
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base operations)? [100% Responded]
The purpose behind this question was to seek data
on the general nature of services that are being
examined for competitive sourcing. The goal was to see
if a common thread exists in the general nature of
services that were competitively sourced. The question
was also designed to help the researcher in
determining if there is a common family of services
that could be competitively sourced with relative ease.
The information in Table 3-4 lists the responses
to this question. As respondent #19 is not undertaking
0MB A-76 studies at the present time, their response is
indicated as not applicable.
In looking at the response it appears that the
question caused some confusion with the respondents as
to the type of answers that were being sought. A
number of the respondents stated the actual services
that were being competitively sourced vice the general
category e.g., Base Operating Support. As such, the




Respondent General Nature of Services Studied
1 Base Library, Telephone Operations, Base Education & Training, Military
Family Housing (MFH) Maintenance
2 Nonessential Services
3 Medical Maintenance, Heat Steam Operation, Grounds Maintenance Supply
4 Maintenance, Base Operations
5 MFH Maintenance, Chiller Plant Maintenance, Library Services
6 Facilities Maintenance
7 Base Support
8 Facilities Maintenance, Base Operations
9 Library Services
10 Base Operations




12 MFH Maintenance, Protective Coating Services, Library, Railroad Operations,
Hazardous Material Handling, Transient Aircraft
13 Maintenance, Transportation, Supply Services, Community Services,
14 Base Operations (including Facilities Maintenance)
15 Hospital operations that are not medical in nature
16 Public Work, Maintenance, Range Operation
17 Base Operations, Facilities Maintenance, Logistics, Information Management,
Food Services, Training Support, Child Development Center
18 Child Care, Family Services, Facilities Maintenance, Warehousing, Bulk
Liquid Storage, Tug Boat Operations and Maintenance, Moral Welfare and
Recreation, Retail Supply, Personnel Administration, Motor Vehicle
Operations and Maintenance, Crane and Rigging
19 Not Applicable
20 Facilities Maintenance
21 Automated Data Processing
22 Ship Operations
Table 3-4 Responses To Survey Question Five
6. Within the general category mentioned above, what
were the exact services that were competitively sourced
(i.e., painting or plumbing under facilities
maintenance)? [100% Responded]
Table 3-5 contains the response to the above
question:
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Respondent Specific Services Studied for Competitive Sourcing
1 Librarian, Computer Support, Supply Stocking, Telephone Answering,
Switchboard Operations, Administration
2 Library Services, Third Party Collections, Hospital Insurance, Hospital Heat
Plant Operations, Telephone Switchboard Operations, Hazardous Material
Storage Operations, Hospital Maintenance
3 Respondent could not answer
4 Grounds Maintenance, MFH Maintenance, Central Heating Plant Operations
5 See Response to Question #5
6 Military Family Housing, Transportation Parts Stores, Base Library Services,
Transient Alert Maintenance, Civil Engineering Parts Store
7 MFH Maintenance and Management, Barracks Management, Furnishing
Management, Waste Water Plant
8 Heat Plant Operations, Telephone Operations, Waste Water Treatment Plant
Operation, Library Services
9 Library Functions (Administration, Collection Management, Financial
Management)
10 Civil Engineering, Supply Transportation, Mission Support Services, Services,
Maintenance, Communications
11 See Response to Question #5
12 See Response to Question #5
13 See Response to Question #5
14 All Categories of services within Base Operations
15 Ambulance Services, Food Services, Forensic Drug Testing
16 Pest Management, Refuse collection & disposal services, Electrical Plants &
systems operation and Maintenance(0&M), Heating Plants and Systems
O&M, Water Plants system O&M, Sewage & Waste Plants and O&M Air
Conditioning and Refrigeration Plants, Other Utilities O&M, Troop
Subsistence Issue Point Operation, Combat Vehicles, Non-combat Vehicles,
Electronic and Communications Equip, Special Equip, Armament, Dining
Facility Equipment, Containers, Textiles, Tents, and Tarpaulins, Metal
Containers, Air Transportation Services, Rail Transportation, Aircraft
Refueling, Training Aids, Devices, and Simulators, Range Maintenance,
Flight simulator training
17 Property Book Maintenance, Pest Control, Logistics Maintenance, Aircraft
Refueling and Defueling, Administrative Support Services
18 Whole functions within the categories listed in response to Question #5
19 Not Applicable
20 Administrative Functions
21 Information Program Management
22 Operation and Maintenance of Tug Boats
Table 3-5 Responses To Survey Question Six
This question was intended to identify the
specific services, which make up the general category
of services that are being examined for competitive
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sourcing. It was intended to expand on the responses
to the previous question. As stated, some of the
respondents provided data supporting this question in
their responses to question #5.
7 . In the case of activities that were competitively
sourced, were cost comparisons performed between the
Most Efficient Organization and other bidders? If cost
comparisons were not performed, why were they not done?
[100% Responded]
This question was designed to look at the services
that are being competitively sourced utilizing
competition between the MEO and contractors. The goal
was to identify a common family of services that which
were utilizing cost comparison studies. In several of
the cases the respondents stated that the question did
not apply to their command. The reason for this varied
from the command solely utilizing direct conversion as
the method of competitive sourcing. In other cases the
command was in the process of finishing their studies




Respondent Did Command Perform Cost Comparison
1 Yes, additionally Direct Conversion was utilized
2 Yes
3 Most of the Studies being looked at for Cost Comparison










14 Will perform Cost Comparisons when time comes
15 Yes
1 6 Not Applicable (Have yet to complete study)




21 Not Applicable (All Direct Conversion)
Table 3-6 Responses To Survey Question Seven
8. What lessons did your organization learn to improve its
performance and that of the contractors as a result of its
competitive sourcing activities? [95% Responded]
The purpose of this question was to capture the
experience of the contracting commands in conducting A-76
studies. If possible these lessons learned would be tied to
the common family of services, if one does exist. Of those
commands that responded, a full third of them stated that
they did not have any lessons learned. Of those that did
not have lessons learned, respondents #13, #14 and #20
stated that their studies were still on going and that it
was too early to tell.
47
Respondent #1 stated that their lessons learned
centered on
...Writing Performance Work Statement (s)
Organizations learned that they did not really
understand all the work the function performed.
They also learned that the commercial world is not
that different from Government processes and often
better
.
Respondent #2 stated that their sole lesson learned was
that the Government and the contractor must work as
partners
.
Respondent #3 did not provide any lessons learned but
added a personal response emphasizing the importance of
Integrated Process Teams (IPT) to the conduct of A-76
studies
.
Respondent #4 stated that the Government needed to
ensure that there was a strong steering group working on the
A-7 6 study. The focus of the group should be instilling
quality and enforcing the timelines.
Respondent #6 did not have a lesson learned for the
contracting branch, but they did point out that as a result
of an A-76 study the costs associated with the activity
increased while the level of performance went down.
Respondent #7 stated that process within OMB Circular
A-7 6 was "not very good" as it tended to take too long.
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Additionally, they point out that senior leadership needs to
take an active role in the process.
The involvement of key management personnel most
familiar with the function was the sole lesson learned
identified by respondent #9.
Respondent #11 stated that "Best Value" should be
employed for competitive acquisitions. They also
highlighted the importance of the Integrated Product Team,
this time in relation to the conduct of direct conversions.
Respondent #15 stated that the contracting officer
should be involved very early in the study process.
Additional involvement should include the local union.
Their final lesson learned focused on keeping the Government
employees informed as to what is going on with the A-7 6
study.
The sole lesson learned for respondent #16 was the need
for a sound Performance Work Statement.
Respondent #18 stated that their lessons learned
focused on the manpower available to conduct studies.
Specifically they stated,
Government is at disadvantage due to inadequate
Manpower resources in-house to perform Commercial
Activity study processes. We are striving to
provide more direct training. Contractor support
to perform study processes is not the right
answer. It takes leadership involvement from the
top to get results.
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The final lesson learned came from respondent #22.
They pointed out that competitive sourcing can be used as
effective motivation for Government and private industry to
develop innovative ways of accomplishing tasks.
9 . Were there any protests lodged as a result of the
competition? If there were any protests briefly describe
the nature of the protest and the eventual outcome. [100%
Responded]
This question was intended to identify commands, which
had undergone protests originating from competitive sourcing
studies. The goal was to identify the nature of the
protests as a tool to supplement the lessons learned data.
In doing so, it would identify potential pitfalls that
installations and Contracting Officers must avoid. Seventy-
seven percent of the respondents stated that they had not
received any protest to their competitive souring. In
several cases, the commands included the phrase "Not Yet" in
their response. Two commands stated they had not received
protests as they had yet to issue final awards from their
competitive sourcing studies. Another command stated that
the question did not apply as they directly converted all of




One command (respondent #15) stated they had received a
protest as a result of their A-76 study. In this case the
unsuccessful contractor argued "...that certain costing
processes used in the cost analysis were calculated to the
disadvantage of the contractor." The protest by the
contractor was denied after it was determined that the
costing process calculated the contractor's costs correctly.
There was an interesting response to this question by
one of the commands. The command stated that they had not
received any protests, but that a number of letters were
written to Congressmen asking them to cancel certain A-76
studies. When queried on this question, the command
speculated that the letters likely came from Government
employees at risk of losing their jobs if the A-76 studies
were to go forward.
10. What were the significant risks associated with
competitive sourcing process that your organization
identified? [95% Responded]
This question was designed to ask contracting officials
what risk factors they had identified in the A-76 process
and the measures they took to manage those risks. This
question was intended to augment the lessons learned
responses. Of the commands that responded to the question
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14% stated that they had not identified any risks in the
process (Respondents #2, #8, #12, and #21).
Those commands that did respond provided a vast array
of risk factors that contracting officers confront. Each of
the respondents' answers to question are listed below.
Respondent #1 stated that its risks were not having
Government personnel qualified to "inspect" contractor
functions as a member of a Quality Assurance Evaluation.
Additionally, the respondent stated that a risk was the loss
of in-house expertise over time would make it difficult to
survey contractor performance and re-write the contract
after the initial contract is completed.
Respondent #3 identified worker reaction to the
competitive sourcing action as a risk. They stated that
they were concerned that the functional worker would fear
that the PWS and MEO teams were out to take their jobs which
would negatively impact the level of support given to the
teams .
Respondent #4 stated that their concern was the ability
to adequately capture the work load data that must be
accomplished by an organization. They also identified the
ability to find a "quality" contractor who could meet the
performance expectations of the Service as a risk factor.
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Respondent #5 risks were the minimum manpower levels
currently in their organization and the requirements that
the SOW not add any additional work by the MEO if they won
the competition. Additionally, they stated that the SOW
could not add any work that would be performed if there were
sufficient Government personnel.
Respondent #6 provided abbreviated answers to the
question, stating that the Government's ability to meet the
timeline, the potential for protests, accurate SOW and labor
strikes were the risks that they identified.
Like the previous command, respondent #7 stated that
their risks were the ability to meet the published timeline
and transition between Government and contractor.
Respondent #9 identified risk centered on the
contractor proposal. The Government local area network
required clearances to access the system. As such the
contractor had to propose how library patrons could access
the Internet and submit detailed plans as part of their
response to the solicitation.
Respondent #10 identified a number of risks associated
with the A-76 process. They stated that their risks
included,
...The large number of positions in COMM (436), the
number of security clearances required, the time
required for processing/obtaining clearances
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(Defense Investigative Services averages 12-24
months, depending on the security level), and the
Information Technology manpower shortage in the
local area our transition period could be quite
lengthy. The Wing military manpower office is
working with ACC to ensure we retain sufficient
manning until contractor or MEO have personnel
clearances, necessary training is completed, and
they are able to assume total responsibility for
functions. Also, the MEO will have to hire
additional workforce to replace the military
workforce. Our local unemployment rate is
extremely low (I believe 2 nd lowest in the
nation) , and local news reports indicate shortages
in some other labor areas as well (carpenters,
plumbers, electricians, and other trade skills).
Respondent #11 stated that their risks centered around
the transition resulting from the competitive sourcing
action and its impact on the mission and individuals of the
command.
The risks identified by respondent #13 focused on the
performance work statement. Specifically, they believed
that two identified risks were:
...Not capturing all the workload data; not being
able to use workload for volunteers in the PWS;
not being able to use workload for borrowed
military manpower in the PWS; lack of experienced
support contractors; lack of clear guidance from
higher headquarters on various aspects
.
Respondent #15 identified four separate areas that they
considered to be risk areas. They provided the following
list of risk factors:
1. One of the dangers is that you make huge
savings and Congress sees that and says we need to
do more. For us in the medical field that could
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be disastrous. Should we offer up a facility or
function that is efficient or inefficient. What
will someone do with our results?
2
.
A second is stepping out and putting
something up for study without considering what
you may look like if you lose the study (that was
significant for us--we were being pushed in Dec 98
to conduct studies. We did surveys of what to do
based on the existing CA inventory ... 6 months
later we now have 12K more re-viewable civilian
positions than in Dec 98... if we had initiated too
many studies in Dec 98 we would now be undoing
what we did before) ....
3 A risk is what to put in the study--we
heard that Aberdeen removed the Info Tech portion
from their Whole Base Study as they thought it
might cause them to lose so if they lost they only
wanted to lose the IT... the final result was that
they won the IT by $16M (100 positions) but
lost the other 600 position study by only
$500K. . .
.
4. Changing rules--not just as in #2 above
but in the overall program. Those rule changes
affect current/ongoing studies. Effectively
providing guidance on what to do when those rule
changes hit is important.
Respondent #16 identified the cost of doing commercial
activity studies as their prime risk. They stated that
there was no funding available for conducting the A-76
studies
.
Respondent #17 echoed the risks identified earlier
including cost of the studies, unrealistic timelines, and
manpower shortfalls created by contracting out military
positions. Additionally, they stated that the Pentagon
expected savings are unattainable from A-76 studies. The
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2 0% savings taken prior to conducting the study was too
optimistic. The final risk they identified was the,
...potential for delays and impediments to study
completion. Projected decrements in BASOP
functions do not facilitate PWS development - the
function becomes a moving target. Reengineering
initiatives eliminate contractor competition and
potential for increased savings.
Respondent #18 stated they identified four risk areas
of concern. Those risks were inadequate personnel to
perform the studies, lack of contractor support resources,
lack of guidance as to what are inherently Governmental
functions, and the impacts on the sea/shore rotation.
Respondent #19 identified "massive upheaval" to the
mission of the organization as a risk. Additionally, they
identified the potential loss of services and critical
personnel as risks of the A-76 process.
The risk of losing in-house expertise and alienation of
the workforce were risks that respondent #20 identified.
Along with that, they stated that there was a risk of losing
focus on the needs of the customer.
The final area of risk was identified by respondent
#22 . They stated that conflict of interest with Government
employees was a significant risk. They were concerned that
Government employees working on the Management Plan and
contracting personnel working with private industry would be
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exposed to proprietary information related to the function
under study.
2 . Data Collected for sources other than Survey
a. Recent and Planned Competitions
Each of the uniformed Services have announced
their intentions to competitively source commercial
activities aboard their installation in the coming years.
The nature of the services looked at in the announcements to
Congress varied by Service and installation. A number of
Major Commands both within the Army and the Air Force
announced their intention to study similar services
performed at multiple installations. [Refs. 16, 17]
In announcing the commercial activities that would
be looked at for competitive sourcing, the Air Force
additionally stated which services would be considered for
competition between the MEO and private firms, and which
would be looked at for direct conversion.
In looking at recent competitions, the General
Accounting Office published a report in February 1999
detailing functions that were competitively sourced. [Ref.
13] The data presented in the study focused on those
competitions that were completed from October 1995 to March
1998. The report listed competitive sourcing activities for
each of the uniformed Services, along with DECA and DFAS . In
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each of the years reviewed, the Marine Corps did not
complete any competitive sourcing studies and therefore will
not be reported in the data presentation.
The GAO looked at 4 6 separate A-7 6 studies that
had been completed. Of those studies, there were several
categories of services that were competed by more than one
installation or more than one service. By far the greatest
frequency of A-76 studies occurred in the areas of Family
Housing Maintenance and Base Operating Support, both of
which were represented in 5 separate A-76 studies. In the
GAO study there was one category of services, Aircraft
Maintenance, which occurred frequently. This is likely tied
to the fact that the majority of competitive sourcing
studies completed during the period occurred within the Air
Force. In addition to the above listed categories of
services the following services were looked at by more than
one installation or more than one Service [Ref. 13 :p. 26-30]
1
.
Grounds Maintenance 3 Studies
2 Power Production 3 Studies
3 Library Services 2 Studies
4 Audiovisual 2 Studies
In review of the proposed studies scheduled for FY
97 to FY 99 there are similar patterns in the nature of
services reviewed for competitive sourcing. The commercial
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activities being reviewed by multiple installations include




2 Family Housing Management and Maintenance
3 Base Communications




8. Child Development Center Operation
9. Automated Data Processing
10. Motor Vehicle Maintenance
11. Administrative Support Service
b. A-76 Lessons Learned
By far the greatest amount of information
extracted from the World Wide Web came in the form of
lessons learned from previous competitive sourcing
activities. There were several sites maintained by the Army
and Air Force that contained lessons learned. Additionally,
there were a number of documents containing lessons learned
from previous competitive sourcing studies. The lessons





Activities occurring prior to the Conduct of the
A- 7 6 Study
2. Conduct of the A-76 Study
3 Source Selection Process
4. Post Decision Actions
The lessons learned include activities undertaken
by contracting officers, as well as other staff functions,
that form the management team looking at competitive
sourcing
.
The first lesson learned dealt with command
support of the A-76 process. It emphasized obtaining and
maintaining support of the installation commander. It also
emphasized that key leadership personnel in the A-76 study
"buy into" the process and set the example for all members
of the study group. [Ref. 19]
Prior to the start of the A-76 study, a key lesson
learned addressed the issue of forming the team to
accomplish the commercial activities studies. It
highlighted the need to form the Commercial Activities Team
(CA Team) into functional areas in order to examine the
requirements of the given commercial activity. Once the CA
- The breakdown of the nature of Lessons Learned was adopted from an Army World Wide Web site in
Reference 19.
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Team completes the requirements analysis, it was recommended
that the CA Team be subdivided into teams that could look at
the PWS, Management Plan, Independent Government Cost
Estimate and the QASP. The rationale behind this structure
was to allow completion of multiple tasks simultaneously,
while still maintaining contact with the larger CA Team.
Additionally, it was recommended that an independent audit
team be formed to ensure that all participants are operating
with a common set of baseline data.
Proposed manning of the CA Team came in the form
of a lesson learned citing the need to utilize full time
participants in the A-7 6 study, rather than personnel who
are there only part time. Additionally, it was recommended
that retired Civil Service employees be brought in to help
man the CA Team. The rationale behind such a recommendation
was that the retired employees would bring a level of
functional expertise that could assist in the collection of
workload data.
Since A-76 studies cannot begin until
Congressional notification is given in most cases, it was
recommended that formulation of the A-7 6 team begin once it
is known that the process will occur, but prior to
notification of Congress. This allows the team the
opportunity to begin the study once notification is given
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and the clock starts running. [Ref. 19]
Another action recommended early on was developing
an open communication policy for passing information to and
receiving information from all of the stakeholders in the
competitive sourcing study. It was cautioned that such
communication channels should not "...divulge information that
could prejudice the MEO or offers or jeopardize the
integrity of the A-76 process." [Ref. 19]
It was recommended that the A-7 6 team develop
detailed milestones for each of the commercial activities
being studied. As milestones are developed, it was
recommended that they be entered into a tracking system, and
that the milestones should be updated promptly if the time
schedule changes. There were a number of recommended
milestones in the lesson learned and included at a minimum
the following activities: [Ref. 20]
1
.
Begin Development of the PWS and Management Plan
2. Complete first draft of the PWS
3 Complete PWS
4. Complete management study
5. Complete in-house cost estimate
6. Issue solicitation
7. Begin source selection process
8. Notify major commands of the initial decision
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9. Convene appeals board (if necessary)
10. Begin transition period
11. Fully implement contractor operations or MEO
It was recommended that commands study an entire
function (e.g. Public Works) when doing an A-7 6 study. This
prevents the agency from studying only part of the activity,
only to waste time and money studying another aspect of it
at a later date. Anything less than a full study runs the
risk of perpetuating inefficiency in the organization as the
most efficient organization for the entire function was not
created or staffed. [Ref. 20]
Several lessons learned focused on developing an
action plan and gaining the support of key installation
personnel for the A-76 process. It was recommended that
installations form a Commercial Activity Executive
Committee. Team members would include the Installation
Commander as the Chairman, Director (s) of the function (s)
being studied, Contracting Officers, Civilian Personnel
Office and Major Commands aboard the installation. The
purpose of the committee would be to monitor the A-7 6 study
and make command decisions as necessary. It was also
recommended that a single individual be appointed to keep
the study moving according to schedule. [Ref. 19]
One of the lessons learned cited the need for
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publishing installation regulations relating to the A-76
study process. Additionally, it was pointed out that letters
of instruction should be published outlining the
responsibilities and duties of the action officers, and
organizations participating in the A-76 study. [Ref. 19]
There was one lesson learned that addressed the
issue of formulating an acquisition strategy. It was
recommended that an Acquisition Strategy Panel be formed to
address the issues of commercial activity business strategy
at the beginning of the A-76 process. Some of the issues





2 Use of contract incentives
3 Use and disposition of Government Property
4 Desired performance factors
5. Maintenance and/or replacement of property by the
Government or the Contractor
6. Required interfaces with automated information
management systems to ensure collection of data
for future contracts and for reports to higher
headquarters
Commands were also cautioned to make early
determinations in the planning process as to how unique
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labor sources such as prisoners, volunteers and borrowed
military personnel would be treated. It was pointed out
that unique labor provides challenges to the A-7 6 study
team, especially if the installation wants to continue
utilizing these groups to perform work, but lack the ground
rules for using them in commercial activities. It was
recommended that a policy be developed which addresses the
inclusion of unique labor sources in the Performance Work
Statement, Most Efficient Organization, and the cost
comparison. [Ref. 20]
The lessons learned for the conduct of the study
tended to focus on the collection of workload data and
formulation of the PWS . In looking at the workload data the
lessons learned stipulated that the command must look at the
performance requirements to determine what functions are
currently being done by the organization. It was recommended
that commands avoid the temptation of using previous
performance requirement studies as the base line of
establishing what services are currently being performed.
The lesson learned stated that the organization should take
a fresh look at what activities currently being performed
and analyze current internal processes to identify inputs,
outputs, and internal controls. It also cautioned against
adding tasks to the survey to stack the deck in favor of the
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in-house organization. Such actions often prove to be more
costly to the Government and have little impact on
contractor bids to perform the work. [Ref . 19]
One of the lessons learned recommended that
commands have a third party review and validate the
requirements in the PWS . Outside validation would ensure
that the requirements listed in the PWS are still performed
and still required. The outside source could also look at
the operating procedures of the activity to ensure they are
current, as well as the frequency of the requirements. [Ref.
19]
One of the lessons learned addressed the issue of
Allowable Quality Levels (AQLs) . The rational behind this
lesson learned was that "...most service contracts cannot be
performed perfectly every time." Therefore, the
solicitation should allow for the establishment of AQLs with
a reasonable level of effort to be performed by the MEO or
contractor. [Ref. 19]
In constructing the Performance Work Statement,
one of the lessons learned cautioned that a Performance
Requirements Review be accomplished prior to moving ahead
with the other portions of the A-76 study, especially the
Performance Work Statement. This is especially true when
the PWS does not accurately reflect the actual work to be
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accomplished. It was highlighted that there were cases
where an MEO was developed to meet the actual work being
done by the activity, while the contractor bid on work
specified in an inflated PWS . The logical outcome was that
the MEO came in with a substantially lower price and the
work was retained in-house. Subsequent challenges by the
unsuccessful bidders resulted in the initial procurement
being set aside and a new competition was held using the
update work requirements. [Ref. 19]
Additionally, the lessons learned cautioned
against Government activities attempting to "Get Well" as a
result of the A-76 process. The commercial activity should
not assume that it will gain additional manpower through the
addition of work requirements not currently being done. In
situations such as this the likely scenario would be that if
the MEO were to win the competition, it would have
insufficient personnel to perform the additional tasks.
[Ref. 19]
There were several lessons learned tailored to the
actual construction of the PWS. The first of these
emphasized the need to avoid telling the bidders how they
should accomplish the work, rather telling them what work is
required. It did state that if particular approaches to
accomplishing a given task are necessary, then those
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requirements should be outlined in Section L of the
solicitation. Additionally, such requirements should be
outlined as evaluation criteria in the Source Selection
Plan. [Ref. 19]
There was mixed reaction in the lessons learned
regarding use of skeleton or previously used PWSs . It was
recommended not to use prior PWSs, as the study group tends
to copy the old PWS instead of formulating one to meet their
specific needs. Conversely, it was recommended that old
work statements be used as a jumping off point and that
individual tailoring of requirements would naturally occur.
The use of such templates would assist the A-76 staff in not
only developing the performance work statement, but it would
serve also as a catalyst to completion of the study in the
mandated timeframe. [Refs. 19, 20]
It was recommended that the personnel from the
contracting office be involved in the development of the
PWS. It was pointed out that contracting personnel are
critical in supporting the PWS team by providing knowledge
of contract requirements that must be represented in the
PWS. [Ref. 19]
Another of the recommendations was the utilization
of database maintenance systems capable of updating the PWS
whenever changes in workload data occurred during the
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commercial activity review, and during performance by the
MEO or contractor. In line with that, it was also
recommended that the Government be given access to the data
collected by a contractor regarding work performed and the
level of effort required to perform a task. It was pointed
out that such requirements need to be included in the PWS
and relevant contract clauses. [Ref. 19]
One of the lessons learned highlighted the fact
that the decision as to the type of contract utilized should
be based on the nature of work outlined in the Performance
Summary. It was pointed out that gaining concurrence by all
interested parties as to the type of contract early on
prevents a situation where the contracting office must go
back and change various documents to reflect a change in the
contract type. Additionally, it was pointed out that work on
the PWS and other relevant contracting documents should not
begin until the contract type is decided upon. [Ref. 19]
Another lesson learned stated the need for
accurate workload data to prevent work requirements from
exceeding workload figures outlined in the contract. Excess
work would require change orders to the contract, which
could ultimately drive up the price of the contract. [Ref.
19]
Additional lessons learned under the broad
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category of the conduct of the A-7 6 study include the
development of the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan. One
of the lessons learned highlighted the fact QASP is vital in
both a fixed price and cost reimbursement contract to
control costs. In both cases the QASP is one of the tools
which the command utilizes to discover discrepancies in the
PWS which could raise the price of the contract.
Additionally, it was pointed out that an in-depth QASP is
necessary to ensure that the contractor performs in
accordance with the terms of the contract and meet specified
performance levels. It was recommended that quality
inspectors should not arbitrarily select a surveillance
method (e.g. random sampling); rather they should rely on
the expertise of the functional personnel responsible for
the implementation of the surveillance plan in making the
decisions regarding the method of surveillance. [Ref. 19]
The next phase of lessons learned examined the
source selection process and awarding of the contract, when
applicable. The first focus was the construction of Section
L of the solicitation. It recommended that the section
include information as to what offerors should provide as
part of their bid. Specific areas included what bidders
should include in their technical proposal in order to
standardize formats to facilitate evaluation by the Source
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Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB). Additionally, it was
recommended that offerors be required to submit staffing
charts showing proposed staffing levels and personnel
positions that meet each of the functions in the PWS . The
manning levels in the proposal should be equated to the
proposed hours in the Cost Proposal. [Ref. 19]
An interesting recommendation from one of the
lessons learned would require contractors provide a Past
Performance Summary Matrix including all the vital
information from similar contracts they had previously
undertaken. The matrix would include technical points of
contacts for other organizations and any data relating to
their performance on a given contract. [Ref. 19]
One of the lessons learned highlighted the fact
that members of the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB)
must be identified early in the process to prevent them from
becoming "tainted" by participation in the Management Study
or Independent Government Cost Estimate. It was also
recommended that a list of personnel who are forbidden from
serving on the SSEB due to conflict of interests be
developed. [Refs. 21, 22]
There was one lesson learned, which covered the
action related to making a final determination of the winner
in the competitive sourcing study. It recommended that
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commands formulate and publish source selection criteria to
serve as a guide in the decision process. It also stated
that Section M should contain language indicating that price
realism will be a criterion used in addition to lowest price
for awarding the contract. [Ref. 19]
Lessons learned for activities after the decision
covered two areas, administration of the contract and
undergoing an appeal. In the area of administration of the
contract there were several lessons learned covering the
phase-in of the contractor into the organization. It was
recommended that the Government and the Contractor stagger
the changeover process covering several months . A final
date should be set for the contractor to assume full
responsibility for the activity and any Government-Furnished
Property (GFP) required for performance. It was also
recommended that the phase- in plan be a requirement in the
solicitation and that evaluation. [Ref. 19]
A Contract Administration Plan (CAP) should be
developed for the administration of the contract. The plan
should include requirements to inspect in accordance with
the QASP to ensure the contractor comply with requirements
outlined the contract. In drafting the CAP, it was
recommended that the contracting officer take advantage of
the knowledge of the functional personnel to ensure that the
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plan is technically sound. [Ref. 19]
Administration of the QASP is another area that
was highlighted. The lessons learned focused on ensuring
that the contractor was meeting the Acceptable Quality
Levels (AQL) and that the inspectors were not levying
requirements or inspection beyond the scope of the contract.
One of the lessons learned cited a situation where a
contractor appealed to the Board of Contract Appeals seeking
funding for additional cleaning required by the quality
inspectors. The board ruled that the contractor was
entitled to the funds. The board recognized that the
inspector did not have the authority to obligate the
Government, but the Contracting Officer knew of the
additional requirements levied by the inspector and did
nothing to correct the improper inspections. 3 In failing to
correct the actions of the inspector, the Board found that
the Contracting Officer was obligated to reimburse the
contractor for the additional expenses. [Ref. 19]
One of the last lessons learned dealt with
directing the contractor on how to proceed when there are
differences between existing site conditions and those
3 The researcher was unable to find the actual Armed Services Board Contract Appeals case cited in this
particular lesson learned. The information was included as it highlights a risk that all Contracting Officers
face when utilizing Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs) in the administration of service
contracts.
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stated in the contract. The lesson learned cautioned that
the Government should exercise care to ensure that they do
not find themselves in material breach of the contract if
conditions change from the time of the solicitation to the
awarding of the contract. The lesson learned recommended
that both the Government and the contractor come to a
mutually agreeable position to ensure that the contract
"gets off on the right foot." They warn that good relations
between the two parties is hard to establish if both sides
fail to handle the situation properly. [Ref. 19]
The final lesson learned in this area dealt with
sharing the knowledge and information gained through the
A-76 process with other commands. It was pointed out that
both Government employees and contractors supporting the
A-7 6 study should be responsible for capturing lessons
learned in writing and making that available to other
commands. [Ref. 20] GAO echoed the same advice in a July
1999 report concerning the value of a comprehensive lessons
learned system for A-7 6. GAO pointed out that,
...DoD and its components have devoted limited
resources to documenting and disseminating lessons
learned and best practices form the various
efforts that could be useful DoD-wide . [Ref. 23:
P- 2]
c . Protests
Protests by unsuccessful offerors to the
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Comptroller General of the United States also provide a
valuable source of lessons learned for Contracting Officers.
The vast majority of the cases brought before the
Comptroller General were by contractors protesting the
conduct of the cost comparison or source selection
evaluation process.
In the matter of Crown Healthcare Laundry
Services, Inc. the protest alleged that the Air Force
improperly conducted a cost comparison between the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the protester, to
perform laundry services at Keesler Air Force Base. Keesler
Air Force Base issued an Invitation For Bid (IFB) during
February 1995, soliciting bids for the performance of
laundry services. The IFB indicated that an A-76 cost
comparison would be performed and included a PWS to be used
in formulating bids and the Independent Government Cost
Estimate. The VA provided its cost information to the Air
Force along with an Interagency Sharing Agreement. For the
purpose of the cost comparison the VA was considered to be
the in-house bidder. Two bids were received in addition to
the VA Bid, with the low priced commercial bidder
withdrawing their bid due to mistakes in the bid. This left
Crown as the sole bidder.
In protest, Crown contended that the Air Force
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cost comparison was faulty as the VA cost estimate
underrepresented the actual cost of performing the work.
Crown argued that the VA's cost estimate was based upon
doing less work than was described in the PWS. Crown
further contended that the Air Force erred in adding the
agency's cost of administering the contract to Crown's bid,
but not adding the cost to the VA's cost estimate.
In denying the protest, the Comptroller General
pointed out that both Crown and the VA were given identical
copies of the PWS. They further pointed out that actions
based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the PWS by
Crown was not grounds for setting aside the award. The
Comptroller General further pointed out that PWS stated that
the contractor must "receive, account for, launder and
return" all items. The PWS did not require the contractor
to count the items, rather leaving it to the discretion of
the contractor as to the method of accomplishing this task.
In looking at Crowns contention that the Air Force
should not have added the contract administration cost to
their bid and not that of the VA's. The Comptroller General
quickly dismissed this argument by pointing out that prior
to the addition of these costs, Crown's bid price was still
in excess of that of the VA's
In this decision, the Comptroller General reviewed
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the Air Force's application of OMB A-76 to this particular
solicitation. As such they stated:
We review agency decisions to perform services in-
house instead of contracting for them solely to
ascertain whether the agency followed the
announced "ground rules" for the cost comparison.
This finding by the Comptroller General
reinforces the requirement of the A-76 team, especially
the contracting officer conduct the cost comparison in
accordance with criteria established within the
solicitation. [Ref. 24]
Content of the solicitation was the basis of
another protest heard by the Comptroller General. In
this particular case, the protestor, ANV Enterprises,
Inc. contended that the solicitation was so inadequate
as to prevent intelligent competition. AVN
Enterprise's protest was based on the belief that the
Air Force had not sufficiently definitized the
specifications of the solicitation in their answers to
Enterprises questions regarding the content of the IFB.
The solicitation envisioned the awarding of a
fixed-price contract for a base year with four option
years for the performance grounds maintenance. The
solicitation also provided for visual inspection of the
areas to be maintained to aid prospective competitors
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in formulating their bids
.
The Air Force held a pre-bid opening
conference with all potential offerors during which AVN
submitted a list of 77 questions regarding numerous
specifications that they believed were ambiguous.
Subsequent to the conference, the Air Force issued
three amendments to the solicitation, two of which
responded to AVN's questions.
AVN maintained that the amended IFB still
contained numerous ambiguous specifications, and that
Air Force did not resolve most of the questions on
AVN's list. As a result of not addressing the
ambiguities in the solicitation, AVN was forced to take
undue risk in establishing a bid. Further they stated
that the undue risk gave the in-house organization a
competitive advantage.
In denying the protest, the Comptroller General
stated that a, "...procuring agency must provide prospective
bidders with information sufficient to enable bidders to
compete intelligently and on a relatively equal basis." They
further stated that "...an IFB need not be so detailed as to
eliminate all performance uncertainties and risks." It was
recognized that there is inherent risk in most types of
contracts and the offerors are expected to account for that
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risk when preparing their bids. [Ref. 25]
In the matter of DZS /Baker LLC; Morrison Knudsen
Corporation, the Comptroller General sustained the protest
of two companies competing for a contract aboard Wright
Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) . The protest was in
response to actions taken by Air Force official originating
from a May 1998 solicitation by the Air Force requesting:
...Submission of initial technical to perform
maintenance, operation, repair, and minor
construction with respect to facilities, utility
systems, grounds and infrastructure at WPAFB.
The solicitation went further to state that offerors
submitting technically acceptable proposals would be invited
to bid. The solicitation stated that technical compliance
would be evaluated in five areas—technical plan,
organization and management plan, quality control, past
performance and transition plan. The solicitation also
stated that "any factor or sub-factor judged to be
unacceptable will render the entire area unacceptable."
In response to the solicitation, two technical
proposals, DZS/Baker's and Morrison Knudsen 's were received
by the closing date. After advising the competitors of the
Air Force's initial review, each of the companies was
requested to submit revised technical proposals. Based upon
the evaluation of those revised technical proposals, Air
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Force officials determined that both were severely-
deficient, making them technically unacceptable. After
making the determination of both offerors being non-
responsive, the Contracting Officer reviewed Air Force
instructions for options available to the command. It was
decided that the appropriate course of action was to cancel
the solicitation and implement the MEO.
The protest by both offerors was based upon their
belief that the determination upon which the solicitation
was cancelled:
...resulted from a failure to conduct meaningful
discussions and an unreasonable evaluation of
technical proposals by evaluators with an improper
conflict of interest.
The conflict of interest argument was based upon the fact
that 14 of 16 evaluators, responsible for evaluating the
proposals, held positions that were under study as part of
the A-76 process.
During the course of rendering a decision on this
protest, the Comptroller General referred to FAR 9.504 for
guidance. The FAR provides general guidance to contracting
officers stating that they should identify and evaluate
potential organizational conflicts of interest early in the
acquisition process. Additionally, the FAR points out that
it is incumbent on the contracting officer to "Avoid,
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neutralize, or mitigate significant potential conflicts
before contract award.
"
In sustaining the protest the Comptroller General
concluded that,
In light of the significant conflict of interest
on part of the evaluators , the evaluation was
invalid and did not furnish a proper basis for
cancellation of the solicitation
Further, it was recommended that the Air Force rescind
the cancellation of the solicitation, staff a technical
evaluation team consistent with the decision and
reevaluate the step one technical proposals. [Ref. 15]
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter identified the methodology employed in
surveying contracting commands which are in the process or
have completed A-76 studies. It also reviewed information
available through various sources focusing on lessons
learned by military units, protest decisions by the
Comptroller General and A-76 study data for both completed
studies and those in progress.
The objective of the chapter was to build the
foundation upon which analysis of the A-76 process could be
built. The foundation was presented by looking at the
competitive sourcing actions that DoD Services have
completed in recent years, coupled current initiatives. In
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addition to past and current competitive sourcing studies,
lessons learned from previous A-76 studies were examined to
extract information for analysis. In a number of cases the
lessons learned were augmented by protest decisions rendered
by the Comptroller General. This information was
supplemented with the responses by a number of contracting
commands from the three Services
.
In Chapter IV the data presented in this chapter will





Data for this thesis pertaining to competitive sourcing
activities were gathered from various commands within the
Army, Navy and Air Force. This information was supplemented
with data from the Internet and other Government documents.
In analyzing the data, the researcher intends to address the
primary and secondary research questions. Additionally, the
analysis will focus on the process through which commands
implement competitive sourcing studies.
In combing through the data, there were a number of
issues that arose relative to the primary and secondary
research questions. This chapter will focus on addressing
those issues as well as examining possible methods of
improving the competitive sourcing process. The general
areas that will be focused on in the analysis are the
following
:




Identification of inherently Governmental
functions versus commercial activities.
3 Identification of a common family of services for
competitive sourcing.
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4. Management of competitive sourcing studies.
5. Risk identification and management in competitive
sourcing studies.
B. REQUIREMENTS OF OMB A- 7
6
Reviewing data collected from the commands within each
of the three Services, it was evident that a number of
respondents were not happy with the competitive sourcing
process laid out in OMB A-7 6. Approximately one third of
the respondents stated that the circular was "Not Very Good"
and that it tended to take too long to complete studies.
Overall, the consensus with many personnel could be
paraphrased by stating that the process in their view is
"broken"
.
In stating that A-7 6 is "broken" one must review what
is required of commands by the circular. The first major
area of concern is the manner under which cost comparisons
are conducted. The circular provides guidance for the
conduct of the cost comparisons, but little else. It does
not describe the method that commands are expected to
utilize in capturing and recording costs. The method for
capturing costs is left up to the command or the Service.
The circular also fails to provide instructions on
calculating non-standard costs, such as use of volunteers or
prison labor. The circular also provides minimal to zero
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guidance on calculating direct costs, indirect costs, and
general and administrative costs for a Government function.
What the circular assumes is that organizations within the
Executive branch already have a uniform and functioning cost
accounting method and system, capable of providing accurate
cost data in a relatively short time period. Since this is
not the case, competitive sourcing studies are lengthy and
difficult to perform.
The second area of concern is the actual conduct of the
cost comparison. The circular does not provide a "level
playing field" in the eyes of fifteen-percent of the
respondents. This claim is made based on the requirement
for the A-7 6 study team to compare the cost of the lowest
qualified bidder against the proposal submitted by the Most
Efficient Organization. In doing so, it requires the
organization to ultimately base a decision on cost alone,
rather than examining the overall benefit that each party
brings to the table.
The circular does not adequately reflect the thrust of
many DoD and Government -wide reform initiatives attempted
over the past few years. This is especially true in the
case of "Best Value" procurements. This manner of
procurement is allowed under OMB A-7 6, but with slight
modifications from standard "Best Value" procurements. In a
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traditional "Best Value" analysis, procurement price is a
factor that can be traded-off for other factors that the
procuring agency deems appropriate. Circular A-7 6 provides
for best value procurement, but under modified conditions.
In cases where proposed contractor performance exceeds that
proposed by the MEO, resulting in a superior grade in one or
more of the evaluation criteria, the MEO is allowed to
modify it's proposal. The MEO is informed as to what areas
need modification and is then allowed to revise their
proposal to meet the threshold established by the
contractor. After they have met the performance thresholds,
the MEO then computes and submits their bid again. The
award is then based on which of the two organizations has
the lowest bid.
The evaluation of past performance is another concept
lacking in A-76. Past performance can be a critical factor
in making a "Best Value" determination. One of the
respondents to the survey highlighted the need for inclusion
of past performance data in the competition, but did not
state how it was to be measured. The circular fails to
address the issue of how past performance would figure into
the prescribed cost comparison process. Worse yet, it fails
to provide any guidance as to how a Government management
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review could or should determine past performance of the
commercial activity for inclusion in their MEO bid.
C. INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS VERSUS COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES
In examining the responses to the survey and talking
with the respondents it quickly became clear that there is a
fairly standard idea how to define and select the "core"
inherently Governmental functions, such as those included in
Appendix C. The problem that arises is determining what
functions are Governmental in nature but comprise a "gray
area", lending credibility to the argument for retaining
them in-house. Since there continues to be a "gray area"
there is no uniform view across DoD as to what functions are
purely commercial in nature.
Several of the respondents stated that their commands
or Services maintained a list of activities that were
excluded from competitive sourcing. Within the literature
there was no documentation that identified those functions
that fall within the "gray area" . In comparing each of the
A-7 6 study announcements of Services, there does not appear
to be a generally accepted view of what services are
Governmental in nature. An example of this is the
management and maintenance of Automated Data Processing
(ADP) equipment. The Navy adopted the view that the
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function is a commercial practice and put it up for study at
various commands. The Air Force, on the other hand, did not
include this function in their commercial activity
announcements . None of the respondents to the survey
indicated what activities were on the restriction list.
This is likely due to the researcher failing to adequately
construct the question in the survey.
In addition to the OFPP determination of what is
inherently Governmental, there are several categories of
services that are protected by legal restrictions against
competitive sourcing. These include fire and police
services and a portion of depot level maintenance work.
Recent changes in the attitude of both Congress and the
Department of Defense in the last few years regarding
competitive sourcing indicates that the number of services
protected by law may gradually decrease. However, it is
unlikely that all legal restrictions against outsourcing
will disappear. There are enough stakeholders to persuade
members of Congress to erect fences around one function or
another. This fact was highlighted by one of the respondents
to the survey. A respondent from one of the Navy commands
stated that a number of Government employees in activities
under study wrote their Congressmen seeking to cancel A-7 6
studies at their organization.
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The desire of Congress to see that competitive sourcing
is used as a tool to reduce operating costs was evident in
the passing of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act
of 1998. By requiring the Executive Branch to detail what
commercial activities that it undertakes, Congress hopes
that it sent a message. The message is simple: the
Government does not need to be performing activities that
can be provided better and less expensively by the
commercial sector. Unfortunately, the message has not had
the impact intended as continued restrictions against
competitive sourcing sends conflicting signals to DoD. The
Department of Defense is forced to implement OMB A-76,
comply with the Fair Act, and abide by legal restrictions
simultaneously. This is virtually an impossible task.
D. IDENTIFICATION OF A COMMON FAMILY OF SERVICES
In reviewing the activities competitively sourced or
recently announced as up for study, a number of general
service categories have been opened for competition by more
than one branch of the military. In some cases, major
commands have identified commercial activities that are
nearly identical on several installations and consolidated
efforts to competitively source them.
It cannot be said for certain whether there is a common
family of services that lends itself to competitive
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sourcing. What can be said is that there are a number of
services that are repeatedly open to competition on more
than one installation or in more than one Service. This
conclusion is based upon the number of Services, major
commands and installations that have had a particular
activity competitively sourced in the past or currently up
for study. Of those services highlighted in Chapter III,




2 Family Housing Management and Maintenance
3 Base Communications




Among the above services, Grounds Maintenance, Power
Production and Library Services have successfully been
competitively sourced in the past. In examining the above
services one may draw the conclusion that these particular
services are common in the commercial sector, and thus could
be easily outsourced on Marine Corps installations.
Although the above services are fairly common across
the spectrum of DoD and the commercial world, this does not
insure that competitions are immune from difficulties,
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including protests. Chapter III detailed protests of
competitive sourcing studies in the areas of grounds
maintenance and base operations. Protests in these
functions reiterates the requirements that contracting
officers and A-76 teams build an acquisition strategy in
accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and
follow that plan. This fact was pointed out in the matter
of DZS/Baker LLC and Morrison Knudsen Corporation, as the
Source Selection Evaluation Board was not created in
accordance with the FAR. The result was the decision of the
contracting officer was called into question and a mandate
was then issued by the Comptroller General to compete the
commercial activity again.
E. MANAGEMENT OF COMPETITIVE SOURCING STUDIES
A number of different pieces of data hinted at problem
areas within the management of competitive sourcing studies.
Within the Services, a small number of major commands played
an active part in the competitive sourcing process. In
cases where major commands played an active role, the level
of support varied from identifying potential candidates to
developing Performance Work Statements. However, with only
ten, of the respondents indicating involvement of the major
command in competitive sourcing studies, the management of
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competitive sourcing programs, have for the most part, been
left to individual installations.
In nearly a quarter of the survey responses, commands
indicated the need for a sound management structure to
support the A-7 6 study. In a few cases, it was highlighted
that the senior management of an installation, including the
installation commander should be involved with the process,
as this lends credibility and guidance to the endeavor.
This important aspect A-76 requirements was also mentioned
on several different occasions in the lessons learned for
the Army and Air Force.
A number of critical issues within the A-76 process may
be identified to reinforce the requirement for strong
management of the process. Some of those issues include the
need to meet timelines for completing the study, resolution
of conflicting interests among stakeholders, and development
of a sound acquisition strategy to manage identifiable risk
factors. In a few of the survey responses, commands
recommended putting together an "A-76 Council" composed of
stakeholders, or putting together an Integrated Product Team
(IPT) for conducting the study. What the responses did not
indicate was that commands recognized the complexity of
competitive sourcing with respect to the need for
"management" of the study. Given the nature of competitive
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sourcing studies, a better management approach would be one
similar to that used for major weapon systems implemented
through a "quasi" program office for A-76 studies.
F. STAFFING THE COMPETITIVE SOURCING TEAM
In addition to having a full-time program manager,
installations should examine the different options assigning
A-76 study team members to a study on a full-time basis.
The lessons learned presented conflicting opinions regarding
the topic. Some commands saw the benefit of having the
employees focus on A-76 solely, while others did not. Those
in opposition pointed out that such a strategy could cause
employees to lose touch with the areas they are studying,
since they are no longer performing the jobs.
Again, one of the critical issues that must be
considered in the staffing of the teams is the ability to
meet the designated time schedule. As one respondent
pointed out, timelines are critical because the Services
have already programmed the cost savings into installations
budgets for future years. Budget shortfalls that arise due
to studies not completed when anticipated will cause undue
stress on the installation. To meet the time schedule, it
is advisable to assign full-time members to the A-76 staff.
The loss of technical competence should not be an issue if
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team members work closely with the activities under study in
the development of the PWS
.
Another benefit of assigning members full time is that
their minds will be focused fully on the task at hand.
Staffing the group with individuals that have other duties
means that the potential exists for them to be pulled in
other directions. The other implication is that both Civil
Service and Service members participating in the study might
have to answer to more than one boss. There is always the
chance that a conflict of interest could arise, placing the
A-7 6 study in jeopardy, as seen at Wright Patterson Air
Force Base in the case of DZS/Baker LLC and Morrison Knudsen
Corporation.
G. DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The acquisition strategy is the single most important
document that an A-76 study team will put together. It will
set the framework through which the ultimate sourcing
decision will be made. As such, it should be the focus of
effort for the A-76 team from the onset of the program. The
importance of the acquisition strategy was highlighted in
the lessons learned and the survey responses presented in
the previous chapter. However, there were gaps in the
information, both in the lessons learned and the survey
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responses, with regard to critical areas of the acquisition
strategy.
The first noticeable omission was any detailed
discussion regarding the choice of contract type for a
particular study. There were brief statements regarding the
fact that the contract type should be chosen at the early
stages of the process to prevent unnecessary changes later.
However, there was no discussion regarding the decision as
to contract type. As with other contracting actions, the
type of contract should be based upon what is known
regarding the requirements, level of maturity in the cost
analysis and the level of risk both parties are willing to
assume.
In communicating with some commands, it was evident
that they intended to utilize Firm Fixed-Price contracts in
their competitive sourcing studies, forsaking all other
contract types. In those cases, FFP contracts may have been
appropriate, but they would not be appropriate in cases
where there are a high number of variable costs, such as
food services. One of the problems with FFP contracts is
that commands are potentially focusing on only half of the
equation. A fair number of the commands contacted indicated
that one of the primary concerns with A-7 6 is that the needs
of the customer, normally the warfighter, will not be met if
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activities are outsourced to a contractor. The FFP contract
would allow the needs of the customer to be met, provided
that the PWS is sufficient in detail. In cases where the
PWS is insufficient, there will be a requirement to change
the contract as to achieve the desired levels of performance
by the contractor.
In examining the types of contracts available to
installations, both the Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm and
Fixed-Price Award-Fee contracts appear to be viable options.
Both of these contracts types provide incentives to the
contractor to achieve a level of service above the stated
thresholds in the contract. Additionally, cost
reimbursement contracts may be an appropriate vehicle if the
nature of the work is uncertain or where the costs
associated with the services are unknown.
In the case of award fee contracts, there are a number
of benefits, that result from the responsiveness of the
contractor to the customers needs. Throughout the life of
the contract, periodic evaluations allow the contractor to
focus their efforts towards the tasks that the customer
feels have top priority. It also allows the customer to
focus the efforts of the contractor toward areas that they
may have allowed to slip during the previous period of
performance. Frequent review of contractor performance also
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provides a medium through which continuous communications
and improvement in performance can occur. In essence, it
draws the contractor and the customer closer together as
both have a vested interest in keeping the customer happy
and the contractor successful.
What needs to be examined prior to deciding on the use
of incentive or award-fee contract is the cost associate
with administering such contracts. In the case of award fee
contracts, the FAR stipulates several conditions that must
be met to take full benefit of the contract structure. A
brief list of these criteria includes the following:
1. The administrative costs of conducting award-fee
evaluations are not expected to exceed the
expected benefits.
2. Procedures must be established for conducting the
award-fee evaluation.
3. The contracting agency must provide for periodic
evaluation of contractor performance against an
award-fee plan. The amount of the award fee to be
paid will be determined by the Government's
judgmental evaluation of the contractor's
performance in terms of the criteria stated in the
contract. This determination is made unilaterally
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by the Government and is not subject to the
Disputes Clause.
4. The award amount that the contractor may earn in
whole or in part during performance needs to be
sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in
such areas as quality, timeliness, technical
ingenuity, and cost-effective management [Ref.
26].
From the above list, it is evident that a great deal of
work has to be accomplished even after the contract is
awarded. The benefit is satisfied customers capable of
accomplishing their missions within given budgetary
constraints
.
The next issue that contracting officers must contend
with in the acquisition strategy is the role that past
performance should play in the source selection process. In
services contracts, past performance can be a key indicator
of the level of service the Government will get for a given
amount of money. The accumulation of past performance data
from the contractor can be fairly simple, as it can be
required in a company's bid. The sticky question is: how
does one go about measuring past performance of the
Government in doing a particular activity? There is no
guidance in OMB A-7 6 on how to measure past performance of
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Government operations. Fundamentally, it would be
impossible to measure the past performance of the MEO, as it
has yet to be implemented. What could be measured is the
performance of the current Government organization. This
measurement of past performance though would be flawed in
that the organization with past performance data would not
be the one competing in the source selection. In cases
where the contracting officer believes past performance data
should be evaluated, he or she could set up the grading
criteria, and then normalize the scores for firms without
past performance data. This base number could be compared
against the scores of firms with past performance data. The
same method would then be applied to the evaluation of the
MEO proposal
.
It would appear that requiring past performance data
might not add value to the process in the competitive
sourcing competition. This conclusion may be made on the
grounds that in all of the competitions, the MEO would lack
data to submit with their proposal. However, the value of
past performance data should not be overlooked so quickly.
In competitive sourcing, the contracting officer will be
responsible for selecting the most competitive firm to
compete against the MEO. Past performance data can serve as
one of the critical evaluation criteria in deciding which
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firm will compete against the MEO
.
A logical link to the past performance issue is the
idea of getting the "Best Value" for every dollar the
Government spends on procurement. The steps for handling a
"Best Value" competitive sourcing study were outlined in
Chapter II. In looking at the response to the survey, none
of the respondents addressed the fact that the Government
was not getting the "best value" rather the lowest priced
technically acceptable supplier.
Circular A-76 provides contracting officers the ability
to evaluate the private sector offer and the MEO in a "best
value" sense, examining the totality of each offer. If
circumstances warrant a change in the MEO proposal, the
contracting officer can inform the MEO of the areas to be
reexamined. In such a case, the MEO is allowed to make any
changes necessary to bring it up to a performance level
equal to that of the private firm.
In conducting discussions with the MEO the contracting
officer runs the risk of inadvertently revealing proprietary
information that could level the playing field in favor of
the MEO. There is a real danger that the contracting
officer could "technically" level the playing field in the
favor of the MEO, raising the potential for protests from
private firms.
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In broad terms, the playing field is not level and will
stay that way until changes are made in A-7 6 that provides
contracting officers discretion in evaluating and making a
decision based on all aspects of the proposals. Given that
all potential bidders are given the same solicitation
documents, there should be no allowance for the MEO to
adjust its proposal. Government agencies should approach
competitive sourcing programs from a strictly business
perspective and formulate their bids the first time to meet
the requirements. Allowing the MEO to reexamine proposed
operating structures and budgets perpetuates Government
performance of commercial activities without any real
competition.
H. CREATION OF THE PERFORMANCE WORK STATEMENT
By the sheer number and nature of statements made in
the broad spectrum of sources examined, the PWS is by far
the most important task in an A-7 6 study. The creation of
the PWS occupies the majority of the time for most team
members early in the process. Failure to adequately
construct the PWS will almost certainly lead to unhappy
customers. The result will be contract modification and
price escalation, eliminating projected savings.
One of the significant points brought out in the
responses to the surveys was the need to have the PWS
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reflect the scope and amount of work currently performed in
an activity. The urge to add work should be avoided, even
if the command would benefit from such actions. The urge to
add work should be avoided on the grounds that it opens the
potential for protests or other legal action. The
contractor in such a case would bid on the inflated PWS,
while the Government, utilizing Activity Based Costing,
would construct it's MEO around the level of work currently
done
.
In constructing the PWS, the contracting officer should
play the role of trusted advisor to the A-76 manager. The
contracting officer is most familiar with the technical
requirements for a PWS, and is in the best position to
advise an IPT constructing the PWS. This will necessitate
that the contracting officer be involved in the A-7 6 study
process from the very beginning.
In constructing the PWS, very little information has
been given to aid commands in developing the PWS. Again, it
is beneficial to adapt practices from major systems
acquisitions for A-76 studies. In this case, a modified
version of a work breakdown structure for major systems is
one solution. In the case of A-76 studies, the program
office could layout the major sub-components of a commercial
activity and break them down to an appropriate level,
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similar to work breakdown structures for major weapon
systems. Once the work breakdown is completed, the team
could rebuild the structure, validating requirements as they
worked up to the major components of the commercial
activity
.
Verification of PWS is another critical issue that must
be addressed by the contracting officer. In verifying the
PWS, a number of recommendations were made by the
respondents. The adoption of Activity Based Costing (ABC)
will aid in the validation of requirements. Without the
widespread adoption of ABC, the A-7 6 team must ensure that
technical experts familiar with current Government
operations review the PWS. Again, the A-76 team will
benefit from having the technical experts interacting on a
frequent basis with the activities studied.
I. STAFFING OF SOURCE SELECTION TEAM
The staffing of the Source Selection Evaluation Board
(SSEB) and the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) are
critical decisions to which the contracting officer should
have input. The role of the contracting officer in this area
should be to ensure assignments to the SSEB and SSAC do not
impose conflicts of interest for Government employees or
violation of legal requirements. The Comptroller General
case presented in Chapter III highlighted the outcome of a
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protest where the Government did not ensure that its
evaluators were beyond reproach. In failing to identify
conflicts of interest, the contracting officer placed the
integrity of the source selection process in jeopardy. The
actions of the SSEB necessitated restarting an acquisition
process at the solicitation stage. It also allowed members
of the Government to evaluate contractor proposals, when
they should not have had access to them. The potential
existed here for Government employees to unfairly aid the
team developing the MEO by providing insight into contractor
approaches to the PWS
.
In light of the actions taken at Wright Patterson Air
Force Base, it is incumbent upon the contracting officer to
work with the A-7 6 program manager to ensure that this
situation does not arise. One of the respondents stated in
their lessons learned that the command should compile a
conflict of interest database, containing names of employees
forbidden from working on A-76 studies. This should be one
of the first steps taken by the program manager when the A-
76 study team is established. Along with compiling a list
of desired personnel for the team, the program manager
should also develop a list of "undesirable" people with
potential or real conflicts of interest. The program office
should secure the services of military lawyers familiar with
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contracting statutes to aid in scrubbing the "desirable" and
"undesirable" lists.
J. RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT
Of all the areas of research, risk identification and
management appears to offer the greatest opportunity to aid
Marine Corps Contracting Officers in conducting A-76
studies. However, in reviewing all available data, the area
of risk identification and management of competitive
sourcing has the least amount of published data. The little
amount of data available addressed risk management
outsourcing in the purely commercial world. This thesis
research intended to fill this information gap from
responses to the survey. Unfortunately, one fourth of the
survey respondents that did not provide data on risk
identification and management. Of the respondents that
answered this question, the risk identified included the
reaction of Government employees upon learning that their
jobs were going to be competitively sourced. Although this
traumatic situation for Government employees should be one
of many concerns for a contracting officer, it should not be
primary
.
A number of commands listed the Performance Work
Statement as a risk factor. Of those commands that were
contacted, an overwhelming majority considered this to be
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the primary risk area to be addressed. What was lacking in
the responses were the steps that particular commands took
to manage this risk factor and mitigate it wherever
possible. It was expected that commands would respond with
a system similar to the work breakdown structure approach
presented earlier along with a validation method, but that
was not the case.
Along with the development of the PWS there was some
concern regarding "gold plating" the requirements.
Although, not specifically stated in these terms, "gold
plating" does pose a significant risk to the competitive
sourcing team and the contracting officer. It opens up the
command to potential protests from the contractor and the
MEO as previously pointed out in this chapter.
The issue of contract bundling or omnibus contracts was
not mentioned by any of the respondents among the risk
factors that contracting officers face. In the case where a
command is competitively sourcing a number of related
activities, it would make sense to lump them into one
contract to maximize economies of scale. This is especially
true in cases where award fee contracts are utilized, and
are .required to generate savings in excess of administration
costs. Omnibus contracts are similar in fashion, as they
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cover potentially several categories of services that may or
may not be related.
The drawback with services contract bundling and
omnibus contracts is the potential to exclude small or
disadvantaged firms from entering the competition. The
following is Government policy regarding the use of small
business firms as outline in FAR 19.201:
It is the policy of the Government to provide
maximum practicable opportunities in its
acquisitions to small business, HUB Zone small
business, small disadvantaged business, and women-
owned small business concerns. Such concerns
shall also have the maximum practicable
opportunity to participate as subcontractors in
the contracts awarded by any executive agency,
consistent with efficient contract performance.
[Ref. 26]
In addition to the policy outlined for small
businesses, the Javits-Wagner-O' Day Act (JWOD) requires the
purchase of services from nonprofit organizations
participating in the JWOD program, typically the National
Institutes for the Blind or Severely Handicapped [Ref . 26]
.
Federal Acquisition Regulation 8.704 sets the precedence for
acquiring services, first from JWOD firms, then the Federal
Prison Industries, Inc. or commercial sources. [Ref. 26]
Contracting Officers run the risk of operating counter
to Government policy if contract bundling or omnibus
contracts exclude participation of the above mentioned
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firms. This must be balanced with agency requirements to
maximize the benefits of competitive sourcing. A possible
solution for the contracting officer could be to issue a
draft solicitation for industry comment. This would allow
the contracting officer the luxury of seeing if the above
listed mandatory sources of supply would be willing to
participate in the competition. Secondary benefits of this
step would include feedback on the PWS, which is likely in
the final stage of development. There is also the potential
of subcontracting to meet legal requirements. In the case
of large contracts, the A-7 6 team may want to address the
feasibility of having a primary and a diversified number of
subcontractors. This would provide the potential for small
or disadvantaged firms to participate in the competition.
The risks during the solicitation phase of competitive
sourcing studies are virtually identical to those of other
procurements. Two critical problem areas include improper
communications with the offerors, both contractors and the
MEO, and having the source selection procedures not mirror
the standards set in the solicitation. Both of these risks
can be managed in ways very similar to other procurements.
In the case of communications with the MEO, as was pointed
out earlier in the chapter, the contracting officer should
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be aware of the potential for "technical leveling" and
tailor comments to the MEO appropriately.
The greatest risk area in the Award phase of the
competitive sourcing study is improper cost comparison.
Recently, Army officials at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds
reversed a decision to award a contract to a joint venture
firm for services at the installation. The reversal came
after an appeals process, which resulted in a revised cost
estimate, with the MEO eventually winning by a margin of
$1.8 million. [Ref. 27] This is probably the worst case
scenario a contracting officer could face. It is likely
that the commercial contractor in this case will appeal the
termination of the contract and seek compensation. This
case reiterates the fact that the contracting officer should
adhere strictly to the cost comparison steps outlined in OMB
A-76.
Post-award risks for competitive sourcing are also very
similar to those in other contracting actions. There is an
increased risk in one area in particular that the
contracting officer must manage: the potential for
unauthorized changes to the contract. As more services are
contracted out at Marine Corps installations, the frequency
of contact between Marines and contract employees increases.
This increases the possibility for unauthorized Marines to
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direct contract employees to perform work outside of the
scope of the contract. Contracting officers can manage this
risk by working with Contracting Officer Technical
Representatives (COTR) , and Marine commands to instruct
Marines on appropriate interaction with contractors. It
must be made clear to commands residing on the base that
only the contracting officer, not the COTR, commanding
officers, Marines or civilian employees, is authorized to
change the scope of the contract.
Risk of protests is something every contracting officer
must face. Management of this risk is rather simple as was
illustrated in the Comptroller General decisions provided in
Chapter III, This risk is managed by following the
procedures established in the solicitation. This requires
that the evaluation criteria stated in the solicitation be
utilized in the source selection process. Deviations from
these criteria will result in protests or worse yet,
overturning contract awards.
K. SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed the data presented in the
previous chapter. Analysis focused on all aspects of the
competitive sourcing process to which contracting officers
are exposed. In certain areas, alternate methods of
conducting A-76 studies were examined, with the goal of
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improving the performance of the study team. In cases where
the researcher thought survey responses and available data
failed to adequately address a topic, information was
provided based upon the logic and procedures of defense
acquisition and contracting. The next chapter will present
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A . INTRODUCTION
The process of conducting commercial activities studies
utilizing the guidance provided in OMB Circular A-76 is
difficult. Numerous factors present challenges and risks to
major commands, installation commanders, contracting
officers and civilian employees. The resurgence of
competitive sourcing in the Department of Defense has
necessitated that installations and specifically, their
contracting officers, fully understand the complexity in
conducting a commercial activity study and competition. The
ability to draw upon previous commercial studies and
maximize the use of available information from both positive
and negative lessons learned is vital.
Given the trend in declining defense budgets, it cannot
be assumed that competitive sourcing will fade away, nor
will the defense budget increase dramatically in the near
future. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Services to
implement sound management structure and techniques in the
conduct of their competitive sourcing studies. Failure to
implement sound management teams and processess will result
in studies that are behind schedule, over budget, and fail
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to develop comprehensive Performance Work Statements that
meet the needs of the customer. Under these conditions, the
likelihood of protests or contractor failure increases.
Such conditions are unacceptable to the Services as they
have already programmed the cost savings expected from
competitive sourcing into future year budgets.
B . CONCLUSIONS
The scope of this research led to a number of
conclusions regarding the conduct of competitive sourcing
studies within the Armed Services.
Conclusion 1. Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-76 needs to be modified to reflect current trends in
acquisition reform.
There are a number of areas that need to be updated in
OMB A-76 to reflect reform actions in the acquisition
community. The circular needs to be modified to include
instructions on how to capture data on the cost and past
performance of the Government organization under study.
Ideally, the same type of information contracting officers
gather on commercial firms should be gathered on the
Government activity. This information could then be used as
part of a "Best Value" determination in a MEO and contractor
comparison. For a best value decision to occur, A-76 will
need to be modified (in implementation) to allow for award
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of a contract on conditions other than price, as is
currently the practice. This would require DoD to treat
competitive sourcing actions as private firms do, by making
decisions based on what is best for the business, not
necessarily on which competitor is the cheapest.
Conclusion 2. There is still dispute within the
Services as to what functions are inherently Governmental in
nature .
The comparison of different announcements from each of
the Services shows no clear consensus at to what functions
are or are not commercial in nature. The majority of
activities designated as commercial by the Services are in
line with those detailed in OMB A-76. There continues
however, to be a relatively small number of activities that
are still closely guarded by one Service or another. On top
of that are legislative restrictions that add more services
to this list. From the survey responses it is apparent that
a number of major commands in the Services are consolidating
their lists of commercial services to eliminate differences
that may have existed from installation to installation.
The requirements of the FAIR Act may eventually bring about
a consolidated DoD list detailing commercial activities.
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Conclusion 3 . The current management style of
commercial activity studies can be improved to meet the
needs of the Services.
It is evident from the data that the management style
utilized currently in a number cases is ineffective in
meeting the requirements outlined in A-7 6 and expected from
the Services. Incidents of protests, contract cancellation
and studies being behind schedule indicate the management of
competitive sourcing studies can be improved through process
innovation. There are a number of cases where the
management of the studies was ideal and the activities
competitively sourced in line within programmed timeframes.
However, that has not been the case every time. The use of
integrated product teams is a step in the right direction,
but will not work on its own. The assignment of an A-76
program manager is the next logical step beyond the IPT.
Conclusion 4. The risk management process is applied
inconsistently across the contracting community in regards
to A-7 6 studies.
From the research, it appears that the contracting
community is inconsistently applying the risk management
process to A-76 studies. A number of commands stated in
their survey responses that they did not identify any risks
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that would originate from the A-76 process. In those
commands that did respond with risks associated with A-7 6
studies, a number chose to focus on the reactions of
Government employees. Because many risks are present, this
indicates that commands are failing to adequately examine
the A-76 process to search out and manage risks.
Conclusion 5. There is no centralized database
containing information on best practices and lessons learned
from completed competitive sourcing studies.
In conducting this research it became evident that
there is no centralized location containing information on
previous A-76 studies. There is some information on the
Internet concerning the conduct of A-76 studies and lessons
learned from previous studies, but it is far from complete.
The problem is that not every service has information
available, and those that do have it spread across the World
Wide Web.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1. Change OMB Circular A-76 to
incorporate acquisition reform initiatives.
The Office of Management and Budget should adopt
changes in Circular A-76 to define practices for capturing
cost and past performance data on commercial activities
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currently performed by Government employees . The changes
should allow for the capture of data similar in nature to
data collected on commercial firms under contract with the
Government. As part of capturing past performance data, OMB
should amend the circular to include provisions allowing for
the incorporation of past performance data into the
evaluation criteria for making a contract award. In
addition to the cost comparison, contracting officers should
be given the latitude to evaluate competitor past
performance, technical approaches, management plans and
other relevant factors. This should culminate in the
contracting officers being allowed to award contracts to
organization capable of providing the best overall value to
the Government
.
Recommendation 2 . That the Department of Defense
establish and maintain a database of best practices and
lessons learned from completed A-76 studies.
The Department of Defense should establish a database
accessible through the Internet containing information on
lessons learned from completed A-76 studies. The database
should be resident within the Acquisition Web homepage
maintained by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology. Services should be required to submit their
input at the end of each completed study. The primary focus
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of the information resident in the database should be A-76
study management and contracting issues, to include lessons
learned, as well as best practices on developing Performance
Work Statements.
Recommendation 3 . The Department of Defense should
establish waiver procedures which installation commanders
can utilize to protect commercial activities they deem
mission critical.
Waiver procedures to OMB A-7 6 should be established,
which installation commanders can use to protect commercial
activities they deem to be mission critical. The research
highlighted that there was some difference across the
Services in the interpretation of OMB A-76 in regards to
which services are commercial in nature. However, the
research did not indicate that these differences were a
problem at the present time. The FAIR Act of 1998 requires
the Services to consolidate their list of commercial
activities. There is the potential for the Services to
retain the decision authority for commercial determination
at a level that would limit the flexibility of the
installation commander. By allowing the installation
commanders to tailor competitive sourcing studies to the
current conditions at their installation, the process has a
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greater chance of delivering the desired service and cost
savings
.
Recommendation 4. The Marine Corps should adopt a
program management approach for the conduct of A-76 studies.
Where appropriate, Marine Corps Installation Commanders
should adopt a program management approach for the conduct
of A-76 studies. The program management approach should
closely mirror processes for development and procurement of
major weapon systems. As such, installation commanders
should designate a program manager and empower that person
with broad authority.
The establishment of a quasi program office for A-76
studies at installations would greatly facilitate the
accomplishment of the task. Foremost, it would establish
unity of command by having one individual responsible to the
installation commander for the conduct of all competitive
so.urcing studies. As for other program managers, this
individual would be responsible for everything that is done
on the A-76 study as well as for successes, weaknesses and
failures in the program. The installation would benefit
from having a focused group leader working on A-76 studies.
Since the timeline for completing studies are a critical
factor, program managers could focus on the metrics involved
in tracking the progress of the commercial study. They
120
would be responsible for establishing study timelines,
program metrics for tracking progress, and retain sole
authority to approve deviations from the study schedule.
They could identify risk areas that have the potential to
cause slippage in the schedule and take action to manage and
mitigate risks. An example of a tracking method is a
modified Earned Value Management System. The A-76 program
manager could track the progress of the study relative to
the established timeline and budget for completing the
study.
D. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question: "What are the
significant issues that Marine Corps Contracting Officers
face when applying OMB Circular A-76 to the outsourcing of
installation support services, and how might they manage
these issues?"
Marine Corps Regional Contracting Officers face the
dilemma of playing a major role in the conduct of A-7 6
studies that are unpopular amongst the civilian workers on
the base. They are faced with facilitating a process that
has deadlines tied to reductions in the operating budgets of
the installations, and has historically taken longer to
complete than anticipated. This is combined with
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instructions within OMB A-76 that do not allow for
contracting decisions for acquiring services from competing
firms based on a best value basis vice awarding contracts to
the competitor with the lowest price. Add to this the risks
associated with undertaking a competitive sourcing process
not attempted in the Marine Corps in almost a decade.
The solution to the majority of issues that Marine
Corps Contracting Officers will face is to "think and
operate outside of the box" where appropriate. They should
search for ways to inject an acquisition approach into the
A-76 process that reflects current trends in acquisition
reform. They should act as advisors to the installation
commander on conceptual issues related to program management
of A-76 studies and contracting to maximize the value of the
A-76 process.
Subsidiary Research Questions 1: What are the policies
and procedures prescribed in OMB Circular A-7 6 for
outsourcing of inherently non-Governmental functions.
The guiding principle within OMB Circular A-7 6 is the
belief that the United States Government should not compete
with the private sector to provide goods and services that
are commercial in nature. As such, A-7 6 provides guidance
as to which functions are considered commercial in nature.
The circular describes the conditions under which
122
activities can either be directly converted to a contractor
or where competition between the Government and a contractor
is warranted. It describes the steps that must be taken in
an A-7 6 study, to include:
• Development of a Performance Work Statement
• Conduct of a Management study to develop the
Governments Most Efficient Organization
• Development of the in-house Government cost estimate
• Conduct of a Cost Comparison between the MEO and
lowest priced responsible and responsive bidder
Subsidiary Research Questions 2 : What is the nature and
scope of installation support services that are currently
being outsourced in the DoD?
The nature and scope of installation support services
currently outsourced varies across the Services and their
installations. The range of services included contracts
that cover entire base operations, to those covering a
single activity on a single installation. In reviewing a
large number of completed and ongoing competitive sourcing
studies, a number of services have been sourced by multiple
installation and include the following:
• Family Housing Operation and Maintenance
• Base Operating Support
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• Base Communications




Subsidiary Research Questions 3: Is there a common
family of installation support services across DoD, which is
currently being outsourced, and if so, what services
comprise that family?
There is no common family of installation support
services across DoD that are currently outsourced. There
are a number of services that have been outsourced by more
than one installation and Service, as pointed out in
answering the previous question. However, there is no data
to support the conclusion that the services highlighted in
the previous question comprise a common family of
competitively sourced services
.
Subsidiary Research Questions 4: What are the
significant lessons learned from the outsourcing efforts
that will be applicable to Marine Corps outsourcing of
installation services?
A number of significant lessons have been learned by
contracting officers conducting A-76 studies. The
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development of a sound and comprehensive Performance Work
Statement ranks at the top of the list. Contracting
officials from the Services generally agree that this single
aspect of the A-76 study will dictate the success of command
efforts to reduce cost associated with the contracting
commercial activities.
Second in priority is the conduct of competition
between the MEO and contractor. Protests have shown that
contracting officers must operate within the boundaries
established in OMB Circular A-76, and the solicitation and
source selection plan. Failure to conduct cost comparisons
within the stated guidelines will almost certainly result in
protests by any number of different parties.
The manning and conduct of the A-7 6 team rounds out the
list of significant lessons learned from previous
competitive sourcing efforts. Contracting officials must
ensure that personnel who may have a conflict of interest
are prohibited from sitting on source selection boards or
technical evaluation teams
.
Subsidiary Research Questions 5: What are the
significant risk factors identified in the contracting of
services and how might these risks be mitigated by Marine
Corps Contracting Officers?
A number of risks are associated with competitively
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sourcing commercial activities at Marine Corps
installations. The principle risk is that the PWS does not
capture all of the work currently performed by the
Government. This impacts the contracting officer as he has
to amend the contract to include work not in the original
PWS and work changes may negate anticipated savings.
Another risk factor is that the chosen contract type will
not meet the needs of the customer and may prove ineffective
in motivating the contractor to meet performance and cost
savings goals. A final risk factor that contracting officers
must contend with is the possibility of unauthorized changes
to the contract by Marines working in close proximity with
contractors
.
The management of these risks depends on communication
between the contracting officer, A-76 program office,
installation commander and the customer. Each must
understand the needs and goals of each of the stakeholders
to comprehend the impact of all decisions made in relation
to competitive sourcing. Open communication will help to
reduce the chances of failure to manage the risks identified
in this research.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis examined recent DoD competitive sourcing
studies in a limited scope. Suggested topics for further
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research on competitive sourcing include:
• Development of a program management model applicable
to the conduct of A-76 studies. Where practical,
the model would mirror the program management model
and tools used in the acquisition of weapon systems.
This would move toward a management approach to
mitigate a number of risks identified in this
research.
• Conduct an analysis of the various contract types
used in prior competitive sourcing actions. The
goal would be to identify contract types that work
best with a given set of installation services.
Such research could aid contracting officers in
choosing appropriate contract types based on lessons
learned from previous A-76 efforts.
• Conduct an analysis of cost savings generated by
competitive sourcing activities. This analysis
would identify whether the Services are meeting
their projected goals. Additionally, in cases where
the projected savings were not met, it could
identify specific reasons why cost savings were less
than anticipated.
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APPENDIX A (DEFINITIONS)
Affected Parties. --Federal employees and existing Federal
contractors that will or could be impacted by a decision to
waive a cost comparison or have submitted bids to convert to
or from in-house, contract or ISSA performance, as a result
of a cost comparison, and their representatives are affected
parties. Agencies or parts of agencies that have submitted
formal bids or offers, in order to compete for the right to
provide services through ISSAs, are also considered affected
parties
.
Best Value. -- The expected outcome of an acquisition that,
in the Government's estimation, provides the greatest
overall benefit in response to the requirement.
Commercial activity. --A commercial activity is the process
resulting in a product or service that is or could be
obtained from a private sector source. Agency missions may
be accomplished through commercial facilities and resources,
Government facilities and resources or mixes thereof,
depending upon the product, service, type of mission and the
equipment required.
Commercial source. --A commercial source is any business or
other concern that is eligible for contract award in
accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations.
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Contract Administration. --Contract administration includes
those inherently governmental activities performed by
warranted contracting officers (CO) , the contracting
officer's technical representatives (COTR) , and related
payment evaluation staff. Contract administration is not to
be confused with contract quality control, performance
evaluation or inspection, which are defined as commercial
activities by this Supplement and OFPP Policy Letter 92-1.
Core capability. - -A core capability is a commercial activity
operated by a cadre of highly skilled employees, in a
specialized technical or scientific development area, to
ensure that a minimum capability is maintained. The core
capability does not include the skills, functions or FTE
that may be retained in-house for reasons of National
Defense, including military mobilization, security or
rotational necessity, or to the patient care or research and
development activities, as provided in Part I, Chapter 1 of
this Supplement.
Cost Comparison. - -A cost comparison is the process whereby
the estimated cost of Government performance of a commercial
activity is formally compared, in accordance with the
principles and procedures of this Circular and Supplement,
to the cost of performance by commercial or ISSA sources.
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Exemption. --An exemption is a determination, made in
accordance with Circular A-76 and this Supplement, that a
commercial activity may be converted to or from in-house,
contract or ISSA performance, without cost comparison and
may be justified by reasons other than cost.
Inherently Governmental Activity. --An inherently
governmental activity is one that is so intimately related
to the public interest as to mandate performance by Federal
employees . Activities that meet these criteria are not in
competition with commercial sources, are not generally
available from commercial sources and are, therefore, not
subject to Circular A-7 6 or this Supplement. Guidance to
avoid an unacceptable transfer of official responsibility to
contract performance may be found in the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 92-1.
Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA). --The provision of a
commercial activity, in accordance with an interservice
support agreement, on a reimbursable basis. This includes
franchise funds, revolving funds and working capital funds.
Management Plan. --The Management Plan is the document that
outlines the changes that will result in the Government's
Most Efficient Organization (MEO) to perform a commercial
activity in-house. It provides the staffing patterns and
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operating procedures that serve as a baseline for in-house
cost estimates
.
Most Efficient Organization (MEO).--The MEO refers to the
Government's in-house organization to perform a commercial
activity. It may include a mix of Federal employees and
contract support. It is the basis for all Government costs
entered on the Cost Comparison Form. The Most Efficient
Organization (MEO) is the product of the Management Plan and
is based upon the Performance Work Statement (PWS).
Overhead. --Overhead is included in the in-house estimate and
is defined as those costs that are not directly attributable
to the activity under study.
Past Performance.—Information related to contractor
performance on previous contracts for similar activities or
services, with a focus on the ability of the contractor to
meet cost, schedule and performance requirements.
Performance Measures. --Performance measures provide a series
of indicators, expressed in qualitative, quantitative or
other tangible terms, that indicate whether current
performance is reasonable and cost effective. Performance
measures can include workload and output-to-cost ratios,
transaction ratios, error rates, consumption rates,
inventory fill rates, timeliness measures, completion and
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back order rates, etc. Quality service measures may include
responsiveness rates, user satisfaction rates, etc.
Performance Standard. --A performance standard reflects the
minimum, sector-specific, Federal requirement for the
performance of a commercial activity. It incorporates both
quality measures and cost measures. Cost measures reflect
the cost comparability procedures of Part II of this
Supplement to assure equity in the comparison of performance
standards with private industry standards.
Performance Work Statement (PWS).--A Performance Work
Statement is a statement of the technical, functional and
performance characteristics of the work to be performed,
identifies essential functions to be performed, determines
performance factors, including the location of the work, the
units of work, the quantity of work units, and the quality
and timeliness of the work units. It serves as the scope of
work and is the basis for all costs entered on the Cost
Comparison Form.
Post-MEO Performance Review. --When services are performed
in-house, as a result of a cost comparison, including those
involving an Interservice Support Agreement, a formal review
and inspection of the Most Efficient Organization (MEO)
should be conducted. Typically, this review should be
conducted following the end of the first full year of
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performance. Post-MEO Performance Reviews confirm that the
MEO has been implemented in accordance with the Transition
Plan, establish the MEO's ability to perform the services of
the PWS and confirm that actual costs are within the
estimates contained in the in-house cost estimate.
Adjustments may be made for formal mission or scope of work
changes
.
Preferential Procurement Programs. --These are special
"commercial" source programs, such as Federal Prison
Industries and the workshops administered by the Committee
for the Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely
Handicapped under the Javits-Wagner-O' Day Act.
Privatization. --Privatization is the process of changing a
public entity or enterprise to private control and
ownership. It does not include determinations as to whether
a support service should be obtained through public or
private resources, when the Government retains full
responsibility and control over the delivery of those
services
.
Quality Assurance Surveillance. --Quality Assurance
Surveillance is the method by which Federal employees will
supervise in-house or contract performance to ensure that
the standards of the PWS are met within the costs bid.
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Start date. --This term is used in two ways. First, it is the
date when a cost comparison begins, generally defined as the
date that a local Study Team is formed and actual work on
the Performance Work Statement, Management Plan and in-house
cost estimate begins. Second, it may refer to the actual
date work is scheduled to begin under a contract, as
provided in the solicitation.
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APPENDIX B (EXAMPLES OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES ADAPTED FROM
OMB CIRCULAR A-76)
AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
• Photography (still, movie, aerial, etc
• Photographic processing (developing, printing,
enlarging, etc.
• Film and videotape production (script writing, direction,
animation, editing, acting, etc.)
• Microfilming and other microforms
• Art and graphics services
• Distribution of audiovisual materials
• Reproduction and duplication of audiovisual products
• Audiovisual facility management and operation
• Maintenance of audiovisual equipment
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
• ADP services - batch processing, time-sharing, facility
management, etc.
• Programming and systems analysis, design, development,
and simulation Key punching, data entry, transmission,
and teleprocessing services
• Systems engineering and installation
• Equipment installation, operation, and maintenance
FOOD SERVICES
• Operation of cafeterias, mess halls, kitchens, bakeries,
dairies, and commissaries
• Vending machines
• Ice and water
HEALTH SERVICES
• Surgical, medical, dental, and psychiatric care
• Hospitalization, outpatient, and nursing care
• Physical examinations
• Eye and hearing examinations and manufacturing and
fitting glasses and hearing aids
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INDUSTRIAL SHOPS AND SERVICES
• Machine, carpentry, electrical, plumbing, painting, and
other shops
• Industrial gas production and recharging
• Equipment and instrument fabrication, repair and
calibration
• Plumbing, heating, electrical, and air conditioning
services, including repair
• Fire protection and prevention service
• Custodial and janitorial services
• Refuse collection and processing
MAINTENANCE, OVERHAUL, REPAIR, AND TESTING
Aircraft and aircraft components




Electronic equipment and systems
Weapons and weapon systems
Medical and dental equipment





• Advertising and public relations services
• Financial and payroll services
• Debt collection
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MANUFACTURING, FABRICATION, PROCESSING, TESTING, AND
PACKAGING
Ordnance equipment
Clothing and fabric products
Liquid, gaseous, and chemical products
Lumber products
Communications and electronics equipment
Rubber and plastic products
Optical and related products
Sheet metal and foundry products
Machined products
Construction materials
Test and instrumentation equipment
OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
Library operations
Stenographic recording and transcribing
Word processing/data entry/typing services
Mail /messenger
Translation
Management information systems, products and distribution






Laundry and dry cleaning
Mapping and charting
Architect and engineer services
Geological surveys
Cataloging
Training -- academic, technical, vocational
Specialized Operation of utility systems (power, gas,




• Facility management and operation
• Printing and binding -- where the agency or department is
exempted from the provisions of Title 44 of the U.S. Code
• Reproduction, copying, and duplication
• Blueprinting
REAL PROPERTY
• Design, engineering, construction, modification, repair,
and maintenance of buildings and structures; building
mechanical and electrical equipment and systems;
elevators; escalators; moving walks
• Construction, alteration, repair, and maintenance of
roads and other surfaced areas
• Landscaping, drainage, mowing and care of grounds
• Dredging of waterways
SECURITY
• Guard and protective services
• Systems engineering, installation, and maintenance of
security systems and individual privacy systems
• Forensic laboratories





Defense, education, energy studies
Legal/litigation studies
Management studies
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INSTALLATION, OPERATION, MAINTENANCE,
AND TESTING
• Communications systems - voice, message, data, radio,
wire, microwave, and satellite
• Missile ranges
• Satellite tracking and data acquisition
140
• Radar detection and tracking
• Television systems - studio and transmission equipment,
distribution systems, receivers, antennas, etc.
• Recreational areas
• Bulk storage facilities
TRANSPORTATION
• Operation of motor pools
• Bus service
• Vehicle operation and maintenance
• Air, water, and land transportation of people and cargo
• Trucking and hauling
141
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APPENDIX C (INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS ADAPTED FROM
OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMETN POLICY LETTER 92-1)
1
.
The control of prosecutions and performance of
adjudicatory functions (other than those relating to
arbitration or other methods of alternative dispute
resolution)
.
2. The command of military forces, especially the
leadership of military personnel who are members of the
combat, combat support or combat service support role.
3 The conduct of foreign relations and the determination
of foreign policy.
4. The determination of agency policy, such as determining
the content and application of regulations, among other
things
.
5. The determination of Federal program priorities or
budget requests.
6.- The direction and control of Federal employees.
7 The direction and control of intelligence and counter-
intelligence operations.
8. The selection or non-selection of individuals for
Federal Government employment.
9. The approval of position descriptions and performance
standards for Federal employees.
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10. The determination of what Government property is to be
disposed of and on what terms (although an agency may
give contractors authority to dispose of property at
prices within specified ranges and subject to other
reasonable conditions deemed appropriate by the
agency)
.
11. In Federal procurement activities with respect to prime
contracts
,
a. determining what supplies or services are to
be acquired by the Government (although an
agency may give contractors authority to
acquire supplies at prices within specified
ranges and subject to other reasonable
conditions deemed appropriate by the agency)
;
b. participating as a voting member on any
source selection boards;
c. approval of any contractual documents, to
include documents defining requirements,
incentive plans, and evaluation criteria;
d. awarding contracts;
e. administering contracts (including ordering
changes in contract performance or contract
quantities, taking action based on
evaluations of contractor performance, and
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accepting or rejecting contractor products or
services)
;
f. Terminating contracts; and
g. determining whether contract costs are
reasonable, allocable, and allowable.
12
.
The approval of agency responses to Freedom of
Information Act requests (other than routine responses
that, because of statute, regulation, or agency policy,
do not require the exercise of judgment in determining
whether documents are to be released or withheld) , and
the approval of agency responses to the administrative
appeals of denials of Freedom of Information Act
requests
.
13 The conduct of administrative hearings to determine the
eligibility of any person for a security clearance, or
involving actions that affect matters of personal
reputation or eligibility to participate in Government
programs
14. The approval of Federal licensing actions and
inspections
.
15. The determination of budget policy, guidance, and
strategy.
16. The collection, control, and disbursement of fees,
royalties, duties, fines, taxes and other public funds,
unless authorized by statute, such as title 31 U.S.C.
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952 (relating to private collection contractors) and
title 31 U.S.C. 3718 (relating to private attorney
collection services), but not including:
a. collection of fees, fines, penalties, costs or
other charges from visitors to or patrons of
mess halls, post or base exchange concessions,
national parks, and similar entities or
activities, or from other persons, where the
amount to be collected is easily calculated or
predetermined and the funds collected can be
easily controlled using standard cash
management techniques , and
b. routine voucher and invoice examination.
17. The control of the treasury accounts.
18. The administration of public trusts.
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APPENDIX D (RESEARCH SURVEY)
The research questions below support thesis research I am
conducting on DoD application of OMB Circular A-76 for
competitive sourcing (outsourcing) of commercial activities.
The goal of the research is to aid Contracting Officers
involved in competitive sourcing of commercial activities.
The answers you provide will be on a non-attribution basis
and will not be linked to specific commands in the thesis.
The questionnaire should take about 5-7 minutes to complete.
1) Since 1994, how many competitive sourcing studies of
commercial activities has your command undertaken?
2) Of the commercial activities studied, how many resulted
in competition between the Most Efficient Organization
(MEO) and a contractor or Inter Service Support
Agreement (ISSA)? How many were directly converted?
J
3) What group within your organization determined which
commercial activities would be opened to competition?
4) Does your organization have a list of commercial
activities that are excluded from competition?
5) What was the general nature of services that were
competitively sourced (i.e., facilities maintenance,
base operations)?
6) Within the general category mentioned above, what were
the exact services that were competitively sourced
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(i.e., painting or plumbing under facilities
maintenance)
?
7) In the case of activities that were competitively
sourced, were cost comparisons performed between the
Most Efficient Organization and other bidders? If cost
comparisons were not performed, why were they not done?
8) What lessons did your organization learn to improve its
performance and that of the contractors as a result of
its competitive sourcing activities?
9) Were there any protests lodged as a result of the
competition? If there were any protests briefly
describe the nature of the protest and the eventual
outcome
.
10) What were the significant risks associated with
competitive sourcing process that your organization
identified?
Please fee free to add any relevant information that you
think would be beneficial to the researcher.
148
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Clifton, D. R., Colonel, USMC, Installation Reform
Brief, Reform Divisions, Installation and Logistics
Branch, Headquarters United States Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C.
2. Cohen, William S., Secretary of Defense, .Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p. 55.
3. Gabig, Jerome S. Jr., "Privatization: A coming wave of
Federal Information Technology Requirements" National
Contract Management Journal, Vol. 27, Issue 1, 1996.
4. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76,
Performance of Commercial Activities, Washington, D.C,
August 4, 1983.
5. Office of Federal Procurement Policy, "Policy Letter
92-1; Inherently Governmental Functions," Washington,
D.C, September 23, 1993.
6. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Public
Law 105-270, October 19, 1998, Washington, D.C.
7. Robbert, Albert A., Gates, S.M., and Elliott, M.N.,
Outsourcing of DoD Commercial Activities : Impacts on
Civil Service Employees, RAND, 1997.
8. General Accounting Office, OMB Circular A-76: Oversight
and Implementation Issues, Washington, D.C, 4 June
1998.
9. General Accounting Office, DoD Competitive Sourcing:
Questions About Goals, Pace and Risks of Key Reform
Initiative, Washington, D.C, February 1999.
10. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, Revised
Supplemental Handbook Performance of Commercial
Activities, Washington, D.C, March 1996.
11. Office Of Secretary of Defense, "Improving the Combat
Edge Through Outsourcing", March 1996.
12. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Challenges
Confronting DoD as it Renews Emphasis on Outsourcing,
Washington, D.C, March 1997.
149
13. General Accounting Office, DoD Competitive Sourcing:
Results from Recent Competitions, Washington, D.C.,
February 199 9.
14. General Accounting Office, Military Bases:
Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support Costs
Are Being Missed, Washington, D.C., April 1996.
15. Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of:
DZS/Baker LLC; Morrison Knudsen Corporation, B-281224;
B-281224.2; B-281224. 3; B-281224. 4; B-281224. 5; B-
281224.6, Washington, D.C., 12 January 1999.
16. Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Years 1997-1999
Announcements of OMB A-76 Competitions
[http: //www. safaq.hq. af .mil/contrtacting/
acqorgch.html]
.
17. Department of the Army, Fiscal Years 1997-1999
Announcement of OMB A-7 6 Competitions,
[ http: //www.hqda . army.mil/ascimweb/ca/ ] , September
1999.
18. Department of the Navy, Fiscal Years 1997-1999
Announcement of OMB A-7 6 Competitions,
[ http: / /www. fac!31 .navfac .navy.mil/csso/ ] , September
1999.
19. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, A-76
Contracting Lessons Learned,
[http: //www. acqnet . sarda. army.mil/acqinfo/lsnlrn/index.
htm], September 1999.
20. Department of the Army Audit Agency, Observations and
Lessons Learned on A-76 Competition Studies, Audit
Report: AA 98-340,
[ http: / /www.hqda . army .mil /ascimweb/ca
/
/lessons /dfault .h
tm] , 13 September 1999.
21. Department of the Air Force, Comments From the Field
Concerning the A-76 Process, [http://www.afmc-
mil . wpafb.af . mi 1 / organizat ions /HQAFMC/PK/pko/ trials .doc




Department of the Army, Lessons Learned and Items to
Consider in Commercial Activities Acquisition Efforts,
[http : / /www. amc . army .mil/ amc/eng/ca /llsummary .doc]
,
September 1999.
23. General Accounting Office, DOD Competitive Sourcing:
Lessons Learned System Could Enhance A- 7 6 Study-
Process, Washington, D.C., July 1999.
24. Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of:
Crown Healthcare Laundry Services, Inc., B-270827; B-
270827.2, Washington, D.C., 30 April 1996.
25. Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of:
AVN Enterprises, Inc., B-270013, Washington, D.C., 5
February 1996.
26. Federal Acquisition Regulation, U.S. Government
Printing Office.
27. Sheftick, G., Drewen, K. J., "Aberdeen Reverses





THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
152
BIBLOGRAPHY
Anonymous, "Reinvention: The Next Generation" Government
Executive, Vol. 29, Issue 4, April 1997.
Baldwin, L.H., and others, Incentives to Undertake Sourcing
Studies in the Air Force, Rand, 1998.
Brackeen, Jeff., and others, "DCAT-an Automated Tool for A-
7 6 Data Collection" The Armed Forces Comptroller, Vol. 42,
Issue 2, Spring 1997.
Brower, J. Michael, "Outsourcing at DOD: All it's Cracking
People up to be", Military Review, Vol. 77, Issue 6, Nov/Dec
1997.
Brower, J. Michael, "Outland: The Vogue of DoD Outsourcing
and Privatization" Acquisition Review Quarterly, Fall 1997.
Clifton, D. R. , Colonel, USMC, Installation Reform Brief,
Reform Divisions, Installation and Logistics Branch,
Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
Cohen, William S., Secretary of Defense, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p. 55.
Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of: AVN
Enterprises, Inc., B-270013, Washington, D.C, 5 February
1996.
Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of: Crown
Healthcare Laundry Services, Inc., B-270827; B-270827.2,
Washington, D.C, 30 April 1996.
Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of:
DZS/Baker LLC; Morrison Knudsen Corporation, B-281224; B-
281224.2; B-281224. 3; B-281224. 4; B-281224. 5; B-281224. 6,
Washington, D.C, 12 January 1999.
Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of: Gemini
Industries, Inc., B-281323, Washington, D.C, 25 January
1999.
Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of: Madison
Services, Inc., B-277614, Washington, D.C, 3 November 1997.
153
Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of: RTS
Travel Service, B-283055, Washington, D.C., 23 September
1999.
Comptroller General of the United States, Matter of:
Symvionics, Inc., B-281199.2, Washington, D.C., 4 March
1999.
Cox, A. and Lonsdale, C, Outsourcing: A Business Guide to
Risk Management Tools and Techniques, Earlsgate Press, 1998.
Department of the Air Force, Comments From the Field
Concerning the A-76 Process, [http://www.afmc-
mil .wpafb. af . mil /organizations/HQAFMC/PK/pko/ trials .doc]
,
27 January 1999.
Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Years 1997-1999
Announcements of OMB A-7 6 Competitions,
[http: //www. safaq.hq. af . mil/ contrtacting/acqorgch .html]
Department of the Army, Fiscal Years 1997-1999 Announcement
of OMB A-7 6 Competitions,
[ http: / /www.hqda. army.mil/ascimweb/ca/ ] , September 1999.
Department of the Army, Lessons Learned and Items to
Consider in Commercial Activities Acquisition Efforts,
[http: / /www. amc . army .mil /amc/eng/ca/ llsummary. doc] September
1999.
Department of the Army Audit Agency, Observations and
Lessons Learned on A-76 Competition Studies, Audit Report:
AA 98-340,
[ http: / /www.hqda .army.mil/ascimweb/ca/ / lessons /dfault .htm]
,
13 September 1999.
Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1993.
Department of Defense, .Report of the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1995.
Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1997.
Department of the Navy, Fiscal Years 1997-1997 Announcement
of OMB A-76 Competitions,
154
[ http : / /www. fac!31 .navfac .navy.mil/csso/ ] , September 1999.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, A-7 6 Contracting
Lessons Learned,
[http : / /www. acqnet . sarda. army.mil/acqinfo/lsnlrn/index.htm]
S
eptember 1999.
Directorate of Contracting, National Training Center,
"Commercial Activities: Lessons Learned" Information Packet.
Fackenthall, W.G., The Role of the Contracting Officer in
the Implementation of OMB Circular No. A-76; Policies for
Acquiring Commercial or Industrial Products and Services
Needed by the Government, Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1980.
Federal Acquisition Regulation, U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Public Law
105-270, October 19, 1998, Washington, D.C.
Gabig, Jerome S. Jr., "Privatization: A coming wave of
Federal Information Technology Requirements" National
Contract Management Journal, Vol. 27, Issue 1, 1996.
Gottlieb, Daniel W. , "Privatizing the Pentagon's Noncombat
Operations," Purchasing, Vol. 123, Issue 6, October 23,
1997.
General Accounting Office Base Operations : Challenges
Confronting DoD as it Renews Emphasis on Outsourcing,
Washington, D.C, March 1997
.
General Accounting Office Base Operations: DoD's Use of
Single Contracts for Multiple Support Services , Washington,
D.C. , February 1998.
General Accounting Office, Defense Outsourcing: Challenges
Facing DoD as it Attempts to Save Billions on Infrastructure
Costs, Washington, D.C, March 12, 1997.
General Accounting Office, DoD Competitive Sourcing: Lessons
Learned System Could Enhance A-76 Study Process, Washington,
D.C. , July 1999.
155
General Accounting Office, DoD Competitive Sourcing:
Questions About Goals, Pace and Risks of Key Reform
Initiative, Washington, D.C., February 1999.
General Accounting Office, DoD Competitive Sourcing: Results
from Recent Competitions, Washington, D.C., February 1999.
General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Challenges
Confronting DoD as it Renews Emphasis on Outsourcing,
Washington, D.C., March 1997.
General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Opportunities for
Savings in Installation Support Costs Are Being Missed,
Washington, D.C., April 1996.
General Accounting Office, OMB Circular A-76: Oversight and
Implementation Issues, Washington, D.C., 4 June 1998.
General Accounting Office, "Privatization and Competition:
Comments on S . 314, the Freedom From Competition Act",
Washington, D.C., June 18, 1997.
Grogan, P. A., Outsourcing: An Examination of the Marine
Forces Pacific Cost Reduction Initiative, Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December
1998.
Harvey, Susan J., "Outsourcing Government Functions-A New
Look at an Old Challenge" Program Manager, November /December
1996.
Hintze, G.G., OMB A-76: Full Costing and its Impact at
Installation Level Within the U.S. Army, Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September
1980.
Loan, R.W., Outsourcing Short Term Costs and Human Resource
Issues, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, June 1997.
Kitfield, James: "Going Private", National Journal, vol. 27,
Issue 45, November 11, 1995.
Kitfield, James: "Depots For Sale", Government Executive,
vol. 27, Issue 12, December 1995.
156
Meyer, N.D., Outsourcing: How to Make Vendors Work for You,
NDMA Publishing, 1999.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993
(Public Law 102-484, October 23, 1992) Section 312.
NAVSUPINST 4200. 79D Competitive Source Selection Using Best
Value Procedures, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1995.
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, "Policy Letter 92-1;
Inherently Governmental Functions," Washington, D.C.,
September 23, 1993
.
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, Performance
of Commercial Activities, Washington, D.C., August 4, 1983.
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, Revised
Supplemental Handbook Performance of Commercial Activities,
Washington, D.C., March 1996.
Office Of Secretary of Defense, "Improving the Combat Edge
Through Outsourcing", March 1996.
Office of the Vice President of the United States,
Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1993.
Robbert, Albert A., Gates, S.M., and Elliott, M.N.,
Outsourcing of DoD Commercial Activities : Impacts on Civil
Service Employees, RAND, 1997.
Rosenfeld, Thomas S., "Opinion and Comment: Privatization:
the Proper Path" Journal of Housing and Community
Development, Vol. 55, Issue 3, May/June 1998.
Sheftick, G., Drewen, K.J., "Aberdeen Reverses Outsourcing
Decision", Army Link News,
[http: //www. dtic.mil/armylink/news/Sepl999/al9990921apgca2 .h
tml] , September 1999.
Snyder, CM., Trost, R.P., Trunkey, R.D., Bidding Behavior
in DoD's Commercial Activities Competitions, Center for
Naval Analysis, 1998.
Tighe, C.E., and others, Outsourcing and Competition:
Lessons Learned from DOD Commercial Activities Programs,
157
Center For Naval Analysis, 1996.
Tighe, Carla E. , and others, Outsourcing Opportunities for
the Navy, Center For Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia,
April 1996.
Washington, William N. , "Some New Approaches to "Reward"
Contracting", Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 1997.
Washington, William N. , "Outsourcing Automatic Data
Processing Requirements and Support", Acquisition Review
Quarterly, Spring 1999.
Webster, C.W., The Suitability of Fixed Price Award Fee
Contracts for the Navy Commercial Activities Program,




1 . Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingtman Rd. , STE 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218










4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center 2
MCCDC, Code C4 0RC
2040 Broadway Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5107




6. Dr. David Lamm (Code SM/LT) 5




7. Dr. Lawrence R. Jones (Code SM/JN) 2




8. CDR Jeffrey R. Cuskey, SC, USN (Code SM/CK) 2
Department of Systems Management
Naval Postgraduate School
5 55 Dyer Road
Monterey, CA 93943-5103
159
9 . Commanding Officer 1
62 Contracting Squadron
PO BOX 417 8
McChord AFB, WA 98438
1 . CDR USA MEDCOM . . 1
Attn: MCRM-M
2050 Worth Rd. Suite 9
Ft Sam Houston, TX 78234-6009
11 . Sandy Taylor 1
Manpower & Organization Plans Office (PERS-03)
Bureau of Naval Personnel
5720 Integrity Dr.
Millington, TN 38055-0300
12 . Colonel David Clifton 1
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380-1175
13 . Captain Richard Rochelle 1
1212 3 rd Street
Snohomish, WA 9 8290
160

63
-raft
6/02 'yjzn-i-onn nlb




